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Abstract
The Solvay conference of 1927 marked the birth of quantum the-
ory. This theory constitutes a radical break with prior tradition in
physics, because it avers, if taken seriously, that nature is built not
out of matter but out of knowings. However, the founders of the theory
stipulated, cautiously, that the theory was not to be taken seriously, in
this sense, as a description of nature herself, but was to be construed
as merely a way of computing expectations about future knowings on
the basis of information provided by past knowings. There have been
many efforts over the intervening seventy years to rid physics of this
contamination of matter by mind. But I use the reports at this Sym-
posium to support the claim that these decontamination efforts have
failed, and that, because of recent developments pertaining to causal-
ity, the time has come to take quantum theory seriously: to take it
as the basis for a conception of the universe built on knowings, and
other things of the same kind. Quantum theory ensures that this con-
ception will yield all the empirical regularities that had formerly been
thought to arise from the properties of matter, together with all of
those more recently discovered regularities that cannot be understood
in that mechanical way. Thus I propose to break away from the cau-
tious stance of the founders of quantum theory, and build a theory of
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reality by taking seriously what the incredible accuracy of the predic-
tions of the formalism seems to proclaim, namely that nature is best
understood as being built around knowings that enjoy the mathemat-
ical properties ascribed to them by quantum theory. I explain why
this idea had formerly been incorrectly regarded as untenable, due to
a failure to distinguish signals from influences: relativistic quantum
field theory ensures both that signals cannot travel faster than light,
but that influences, broadly conceived, cannot be imagined to enjoy
that property. Failure to recognize this fact had made a realistic inter-
pretation of quantum theory seem impossible. I then explain how our
conscious knowings can play a causally efficacious and binding role
in brain dynamics without violating the statistical rules of quantum
theory, and describe how these features provide a foundation for un-
derstanding how consciousness could have evolved by natural selection
from primitive beginnings.
Invited Paper: The X-th Max Born Symposium “Quantum Future”.
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1. Introduction.
The modern era was created probably as much by Descartes’ conceptual
separation of mind from matter as by any other event. This move freed sci-
ence from the religious dogmas and constraints of earlier times, and allowed
scientists to delve into the important mathematical regularities of the ob-
served physical world. Descartes himself allowed interaction between mind
and matter to occur within the confines of a human brain, but the determin-
istic character of the physical world specified later by Newtonian mechanics
seemed to rule out completely, even within our brains, any interference of
mind with the workings of matter. Thus the notion of a completely mechan-
ical universe, controlled by universal physical laws, became the new dogma
of science.
It can readily be imagined that within the milieu dominated by such
thinking there would be stout opposition to the radical claims of the founders
of quantum theory that our conscious human knowings should be taken as
the basis of our fundamental theory of nature. Yet the opposition to this
profound shift in scientific thinking was less fierce than one might suppose.
For, in the end, no one could dispute that science rests on what we can
know, and quantum theory was formulated in practical human terms that
rested squarely on that fact. Hence the momentous philosophical shift was
achieved by some subtle linguistic reformulations that were inculcated into
the minds of the students and practitioners of quantum theory. The new
thought patterns, and the calculations they engendered, worked beautifully,
insofar as one kept to the specified practical issues, and refrained, as one was
instructed to do, from asking certain “meaningless” metaphysical questions.
Of course, there are a few physicists who are dissatisfied with purely
practical success, and want to understand what the practical success of these
computational rules is telling us about ourselves and the nature of the world
in which we live. Efforts to achieve such an understanding are proliferating,
and the present work is of that genre. Historically, efforts to achieve increas-
ingly coherent and comprehensive understandings of the clues we extract
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from Nature have occasionally led to scientific progress.
The outline of the present work is as follows. In section 2, I document
the claim made above that the orthodox Copenhagen interpretation of quan-
tum theory is based squarely and explicitly on human knowings. The aim
of the paper is to imbed this orthodox pragmatic epistemological theory in
a rationally coherent naturalistic ontology in a minimalistic way that causes
no disruption of anything that orthodox quantum theory says, but merely
supplies a natural ontological underpinning. In the special case of processes
occurring in human body/brains this ontological structure involves human
conscious knowings that enter into the brain dynamics in a manner that ac-
counts for the way that these knowings enter into the orthodox interpretation
of quantum theory.
In section 3 I discuss another interpretation, which is probably the com-
mon contemporary interpretation of the Copenhagen interpretation. It is
coarse in that it is imprecise on essential theoretical points. Because it is
common and coarse I call it the Vulgar Copenhagen Interpretation.
In section 4 the unusual causal structure of quantum theory is discussed,
and is used to justify, in the context of trying to understand the role of mind
in nature: 1) the rejection of the classical ontology, 2) the reasonableness of
attempting to ontologicalize the orthodox interpretation of quantum theory,
and 3) the expectation that our knowings involve non-local aspects.
Section 5 is entitled “All roads lead to Solvay 1927”. The 1927 Solvay
conference, seventy years ago, marked the birth of the orthodox Copenhagen
interpretation of quantum theory. In this section I review this Symposium
from a certain point of view, namely the viewpoint that many of the high-
lights of the Symposium confirm the basic message of the orthodox interpre-
tation, namely that the only reasonable way to make rational sense out of the
empirical data is to regard nature as being built out of knowings. I argue that
the experience of the last seventy years suggests the reasonableness of taking
this interpretation seriously: more seriously than the founders of quantum
theory took it. Basically, they said, cautiously, that the mathematical for-
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malism is a useful tool for forming expectations about our future knowings
on the basis of our past ones. That claim has been now been abundantly
confirmed, also in fields far beyond the narrow confines of atomic physics.
But the founders scrupulously avoided any suggestion that this mathematical
formalism corresponded to reality. They either discouraged us from asking
questions about what is really happening, or, if pressed, looked for reality
not in their own knowledge-based formalism, but in terms of more conven-
tional physical terms. This reluctance to take their own formalism seriously
was, I think, the result partly of an inertial carry-over from classical physics,
which shunned and excluded any serious consideration of mind in physics,
and partly of a carry-over of an idea from the special theory of relativity.
This is the idea that no influence or signal could propagate faster than light.
However, in quantum theory there is a sharp distinction between signal and
influence, because it can be proved both that no signal can be transmitted
faster than light, and that this property cannot be imagined to hold for in-
fluences. The distinction between signal and influence has to do with the
difference between the causal structure of the deterministic evolution of the
statistical predictions of the theory and the causal structure of something
that has no analog in classical mechanics, namely the selection process that
acts within the deterministic structure that is the analog of the classical
deterministic structure, but that is not fully determined by that structure.
In cosmological solutions in general relativity there is usually a preferred
set of advancing spacelike surfaces that provide a natural definition of in-
stantaneousness. Also, there is the empirical cosmological preferred frame
defined by the background black-body radiation. So the idea of special rel-
ativity that there is no preferred frame for the universe, although it may
indeed hold for the formulation of the general local-deterministic laws, is not
as compelling now as it was in 1905, or even 1927: that idea could very well
break down in our particular universe at the level of the selection of partic-
ular individual results (knowings). Indeed, I believe it must break down at
that level. (Stapp, 1997)
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So I propose to take seriously the message of Solvay 1927, that nature be
understood as built out of knowings. But we must then learn how better to
understand knowings, within the mathematical framework provided by the
quantum formalism.
In section 6 I distinguish the two different components of the quantum
mechanical evolutionary process, the unitary/local part and the nonunitary/
nonlocal part, and note that our conscious knowings, as they occur in the
quantum description, enter only into the latter part. But that part is elimi-
nated when one takes the classical approximation to the quantum dynamics.
Thus from the perspective of quantum mechanics it would be irrational to try
to find consciousness in a classical conception of nature, because that con-
ception corresponds to an approximation to the basic dynamics from which
the process associated with consciousness has been eradicated.
I note there also that the ontologicalization of the quantum mechanical
description dissolves, or at least radically transforms the mind-matter dual-
ism. The reason is this: in the classical theory one specifies at the outset
that the mathematical quantities of the theory represent the physical con-
figuration of matter, and hence one needs to explain later how something so
seemingly different from matter as our conscious knowings fit in. But in the
quantum case one specifies from the outset that the mathematical quantities
of the theory describe properties of knowings, so there is no duality that needs
explaining: no reality resembling the substantive matter of classical physics
ever enters at all. One has, instead, a sequence of events that are associated
from the outset with experiences, and that evolve within a mathematically
specified framework.
Section 7 lays out more explicitly the two kinds of processes by showing
how they can be considered to be evolutions in two different time variables,
called process time and mathematical time.
Section 8 goes into the question of the ontological nature of the “quantum
stuff” of the universe.
In the sections 9 and 10 I describe the proposed ontology. It brings con-
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scious knowings efficaciously into quantum brain dynamics. The basic point
is that in a theory with objectively real quantum jumps, some of which are
identifiable with the quantum jumps that occur in the orthodox epistemo-
logical interpretation, one needs three things that lie beyond what orthodox
quantum theory provides:
1. A process that defines the conditions under which these jumps occur, and
the possibilities for what that jump might be.
2. A process that selects which one of the possibilities actually occurs.
3. A process that brings the entire universe into concordance with the se-
lected outcome.
Nothing in the normal quantum description of nature in terms of vectors
in Hilbert space accomplishes either 1 or 2. And 3 is simply put in by
hand. So there is a huge logical gap in the orthodox quantum description, if
considered from an ontological point of view. Some extra process, or set of
processes, not described in the orthodox physical theory, is needed.
I take a minimalistic and naturalistic stance, admitting only the least
needed to account for the structure of the orthodox quantum mechanical
rules.
In appendix A I show why the quantum character of certain synaptic
processes make it virtually certain that the quantum collapse process will
exercise dominant control over the course of a conscious mind/brain pro-
cesses.
2. The subjective character of the orthodox interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics.
In the introduction to his book “Quantum theory and reality” the philoso-
pher of science Mario Bunge (1967) said: “The physicist of the latest gener-
ation is operationalist all right, but usually he does not know, and refuses to
believe, that the original Copenhagen interpretation — which he thinks he
supports — was squarely subjectivist, i.e., nonphysical.”
Let there be no doubt about this.
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Heisenberg (1958a): “The conception of objective reality of the elemen-
tary particles has thus evaporated not into the cloud of some obscure new
reality concept but into the transparent clarity of a mathematics that rep-
resents no longer the behavior of particles but rather our knowledge of this
behaviour.”
Heisenberg (1958b): “...the act of registration of the result in the mind of
the observer. The discontinuous change in the probablitity function... takes
place with the act of registration, because it is the discontinuous change
in our knowledge in the instant of registration that has its image in the
discontinuous change of the probability function.”
Heisenberg (1958b:) “When old adage ‘Natura non facit saltus’ is used
as a basis of a criticism of quantum theory, we can reply that certainly our
knowledge can change suddenly, and that this fact justifies the use of the
term ‘quantum jump’. ”
Wigner (1961): “the laws of quantum mechanics cannot be formulated...without
recourse to the concept of consciousness.”
Bohr (1934): “In our description of nature the purpose is not to disclose
the real essence of phenomena but only to track down as far as possible
relations between the multifold aspects of our experience.”
In his book “The creation of quantum mechanics and the Bohr-Pauli
dialogue” (Hendry, 1984) the historian John Hendry gives a detailed account
of the fierce struggles by such eminent thinkers as Hilbert, Jordan, Weyl,
von Neumann, Born, Einstein, Sommerfeld, Pauli, Heisenberg, Schroedinger,
Dirac, Bohr and others, to come up with a rational way of comprehending the
data from atomic experiments. Each man had his own bias and intuitions,
but in spite of intense effort no rational comprehension was forthcoming.
Finally, at the 1927 Solvay conference a group including Bohr, Heisenberg,
Pauli, Dirac, and Born come into concordance on a solution that came to be
called “The Copenhagen Interpretation”. Hendry says: “Dirac, in discussion,
insisted on the restriction of the theory’s application to our knowledge of a
system, and on its lack of ontological content.” Hendry summarized the
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concordance by saying: “On this interpretation it was agreed that, as Dirac
explained, the wave function represented our knowledge of the system, and
the reduced wave packets our more precise knowledge after measurement.”
Certainly this profound shift in physicists’ conception of the basic nature
of their endeavour, and the meanings of their formulas, was not a frivolous
move: it was a last resort. The very idea that in order to comprehend atomic
phenomena one must abandon physical ontology, and construe the mathe-
matical formulas to be directly about the knowledge of human observers,
rather than about the external real events themselves, is so seemingly prepos-
terous that no group of eminent and renowned scientists would ever embrace
it except as an extreme last measure. Consequently, it would be frivolous
of us simply to ignore a conclusion so hard won and profound, and of such
apparent direct bearing on our effort to understand the connection of our
knowings to our bodies.
Einstein never accepted the Copenhagen interpretation. He said: “What
does not satisfy me, from the standpoint of principle, is its attitude toward
what seems to me to be the programmatic aim of all physics: the complete
description of any (individual) real situation (as it supposedly exists irrespec-
tive of any act of observation of substantiation).” (Einstein, 1951, p.667) and
“What I dislike in this kind of argumentation is the basic positivistic atti-
tude, which from my view is untenable, and which seems to me to come to the
same thing as Berkeley’s principle, esse est percipi. (Einstein, 1951, p. 669).
Einstein struggled until the end of his life to get the observer’s knowledge
back out of physics. But he did not succeed! Rather he admitted that: “It is
my opinion that the contemporary quantum theory...constitutes an optimum
formulation of the [statistical] connections.” (ibid. p. 87). He referred to:
“the most successful physical theory of our period, viz., the statistical quan-
tum theory which, about twenty-five years ago took on a logically consistent
form. ... This is the only theory at present which permits a unitary grasp of
experiences concerning the quantum character of micro-mechanical events.”
(ibid p. 81).
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One can adopt the cavalier attitude that these profound difficulties with
the classical conception of nature are just some temporary retrograde aber-
ration in the forward march of science. Or one can imagine that there is
simply some strange confusion that has confounded our best minds for seven
decades, and that their absurd findings should be ignored because they do
not fit our intuitions. Or one can try to say that these problems concern only
atoms and molecules, and not things built out of them. In this connection
Einstein said: “But the ‘macroscopic’ and ‘microscopic’ are so inter-related
that it appears impracticable to give up this program [of basing physics on
the ‘real’] in the ‘microscopic’ alone.” (ibid, p.674).
The examination of the “locality” properties entailed by the validity of
the predictions of quantum theory that was begun by Einstein, Podolsky,
and Rosen, and was pursued by J.S. Bell, has led to a strong conclusion
(Stapp, 1997) that bears out this insight that the profound deficiencies the
classical conception of nature are not confinable to the micro-level. This key
result will be discussed in section 4. But first I discuss the reason why, as
Mario Bunge said: “The physicist of the latest generation is operationalist all
right, but usually he does not know, and refuses to believe, that the original
Copenhagen interpretation — which he thinks he supports — was squarely
subjectivist, i.e., nonphysical.”
3. The Vulgar Copenhagen Interpretation.
Let me call the original subjectivist, knowledge-based Copenhagen in-
terpretation the “strict” Copenhagen interpretation. It is pragmatic in the
sense that it is a practical viewpoint based on human experience, including
sensations, thoughts, and ideas. These encompass both the empirical foun-
dation of our physical theories and the carrier of these theories, and perhaps
all that really matters to us, since anything that will never influence any
human experience is, at least from an anthropocentric viewpoint, of no value
to us, and of uncertain realness.
Nevertheless, the prejudice of many physicists, including Einstein, is that
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the proper task of scientists is to try to construct a rational theory of nature
that is not centered on such a small part of the natural world as human
experience.
The stalwarts of the Copenhagen interpretation were not unaware of the
appeal of that idea to some of their colleagues, and they had to deal with it in
some way. Thus one finds Bohr(1949) saying, in his contribution ‘Discussion
with Einstein’ to the Schilpp(1951) volume on Einstein:
“In particular, it must be realized that—besides in the account of the placing
and timing on the instruments forming the experimental arrangement—all
unambiguous use of space-time concepts in the description of atomic phe-
nomena is confined to the recording of observations which refer to marks on
a photographic plate or similar practically irreversible amplification effects
like the building of a water drop around an ion in a cloud-chamber.”
and,
“On the lines of objective description, it is indeed more appropriate to use
the word phenomenon to refer only to observations obtained under circum-
stances whose description includes an account of the whole experimental
arrangement. In such terminology, the observational problem in quantum
physics is deprived of any special intricacy and we are, moreover, directly
reminded that every atomic phenomena is closed in the sense that its obser-
vation is based on registrations obtained by means of suitable amplification
devices with irreversible functioning such as, for example, permanent marks
on a photographic plate, caused by the penetration of electrons into the
emulsion. In this connection, it is important to realize that the quantum me-
chanical formalism permits well-defined applications referring only to such
closed phenomena.”
These are carefully crafted statements. If read carefully they do not
contradict the basic thesis of the strict Copenhagen interpretation that the
quantum formalism is about our observations described in plain language
that allows us to “tell others what we have done and what we have learned.”
On the other hand, it seems also to be admitting that there really are
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events occurring ‘out there’, which are we are observing, but which do not
derive their realness from our observations of them.
Heisenberg (1958) says something quite similar:
“The observation, on the other hand, enforces the description in space and
time but breaks the determined continuity of the probability function by
changing our knowledge of the system.”
”Since through the observation our knowledge of the system has changed dis-
continuously, its mathematical representation also has undergone the quan-
tum jump, and we speak of a ‘quantum jump’ .”
“A real difficulty in understanding the interpretation occurs when one asks
the famous question: But what happens ‘really’ in an atomic event?”
“If we want to describe what happens in an atomic event, we have to realize
that the word ‘happens’ can apply only to the observation, not to the state
of affairs between the two observations. It [ the word ‘happens’ ] applies to
the physical, not the psychical act of observation, and we may say that the
transition from the ‘possible’ to the ‘actual’ takes place as soon as the inter-
action of the object with the measuring device, and therefore with the rest of
the world, has come into play; it is not connected with the act of registration
of the result in the mind of the observer. The discontinuous change in the
probability function, however, occurs with the act of registration, because it
is the discontinuous change in our knowledge in the instant of recognition
that has its image in the discontinuous change in the probability function.”
All of this is very reasonable. But it draws a sharp distinction between the
quantum formalism, which is about knowledge, and a world of real events that
are actually occurring ‘out there’, and that can be understood as transitions
from the ‘possible’ to the ‘actual’, closed by irreversible processes when the
interaction between the object and the measuring device, and hence the rest
of the world, comes into play.
Yet the extreme accuracy of detailed theoretical calculations [one part in
a hundred million in one case] seems to make it clear that the mathematical
formalism must be closely connected not merely to our knowledge but also
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to what is really happening ‘out there’: it must be much more than a mere
representation of our human knowledge and expectations.
I call this natural idea—that the events in the formalism correspond
closely to real “physical” events out there at the devices—the Vulgar Copen-
hagen Interpretation: vulgar in the sense of common and coarse.
This vulgar interpretation is I think the common interpretation among
practicing quantum physicists: at this symposium some important exper-
imentalists were, as Mario Bunge suggested, unwilling to believe that the
quantum mechanical formalism was about ‘our knowledge’. And it is coarse:
the idea of what constitutes an ‘irreversible’ process is not carefully specified,
nor is the precise meaning of ‘as soon as the interaction with the object with
the measuring device comes into play’.
My aim in this paper is to reconcile the strict and vulgar interpretations:
i.e., to reconcile the insight of the founders of quantum theory that the
mathematical formalism of quantum is about knowledge with the demand
of Einstein that our basic physical theory be a theory of nature herself.
The main obstacle to a rational understanding of these matters is the
faster-than-light action that the quantum formalism seems to entail, if inter-
preted at a physical level. If one takes literally the idea that the quantum
event at the device constitutes a real transition from some physical state
of ‘possibility’ or ‘propensity’ to a state of ‘actuality’ then—in the ‘entan-
gled states’ of the kind studied by Schroedinger, by Einstein, Podolsky, and
Rosen, and by Bell and others—it would seem that the mere act of making
a measurement in one region would, in certain cases, instantly produce a
change in the physical propensities in some far-away region. This apparent
faster-than-light effect is dealt with in the strict Copenhagen interpretation
by denying that the probability function in the formalism represents anything
physical: the formalism is asserted to represent only our knowledge, and our
knowledge of far-away situations can be instantly changed—in systems with
correlations—by merely acquiring information locally.
This fact that the strict Copenhagen interpretation “explains away” the
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apparent violations of the prohibition [suggested by the theory of relativity]
of faster-than-light actions is a main prop of that interpretation.
So the essential first question in any attempt to describe nature herself
is the logical status of the claimed incompatibility of quantum theory with
the idea—from the theory of relativity in classical physics—that no influence
can act backward in time in any frame of reference.
It is of utmost importance to progress in this field that we get this matter
straight.
4. Causality, Locality, and Ontology.
David Hume cast the notion of causality into disrepute. However, when
one is considering the character of a putative law of evolution of a physical
system it is possible to formulate in a mathematically clean way a concept
of causality that is important in contemporary physical theory.
In relativistic physics, both classical and quantum mechanical, the idea
of causality is introduced in the following way:
We begin with some putative law of evolution of a physical system. This
law is specified by picking a certain function called the Lagragian. A key
feature of the possible Lagrangians is that one can modify them by adding
a term that corresponds to putting in an extra-force that acts only in some
small spacetime region R.
The evolution is specified by the “law” specified by the chosen Lagrangian,
plus boundary conditions. Let us suppose that boundary condition is spec-
ified as the complete description of “everything” before some “initial time”
Tin. The laws then determine, in principle, “everything” for all later times.
In classical mechanics “everything” means the values of all of the physical
variables that are supposed to describe the physical system that is being
considered, which might be the entire physical universe.
In quantum mechanics “everything” means all of the “expectation values”
of all of the conceivable possible physical observables, where “expectation
value” means a predicted average value over an (in principle) infinite set of
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instances.
To bring in the notion of causality one proceeds as follows. It is possible,
both in classical and quantum theory, to imagine changing incrementally the
Lagrangian that specifies the law of evolution. The change might correspond
to adding extra terms to the forces acting on certain kinds of particles if they
are in some small spacetime region R that lies later than time Tin. Such a
change might be regarded as being introduced whimsically by some outside
agent. But, in any case, one can compare the values of “everything” at times
later than time Tin in the new modified world (i.e., the world controlled by
the new modified Lagrangian) to the values generated from the laws specified
by the original Lagrangian. If one is dealing with an idealized world without
gravity, or at least without any distortion of the ‘flat’ Minkowsky spacetime,
then it is a mathematical property of relativistic field theories, both classical
and quantum mechanical, that “nothing” will be changed outside the forward
light cone of the region R in which the Lagrangian was changed!
In other word, “everything” will be exactly the same in the two cases
at all points that cannot be reached from the spacetime region R without
moving faster than the speed of light.
This property of relativistic field theories is called a causality property.
The intuition is that this change in the Lagrangian can be regarded, or
identified, as a “cause”, because it can be imposed whimsically from outside
the physical system. The mathematical property just described says that the
effects of this “cause” are confined to its forward light cone; i.e., to spacetime
points that can be reached from the spacetime region R of the cause without
ever traveling at a speed greater than the speed of light.
Relativistic field theories are formulated mathematically in such a way
that this causality property holds. This means that insofar as it is legiti-
mate to imagine that human beings can “freely choose” [i.e., can act or not
act upon a physical system without there being any cause from within that
physical system of this act] to do one thing or another in a region R [e.g., to
exert or not exert a force on some physical particles of the system in region
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R] then “everything” outside the forward light cone of R will be independent
of this choice: i.e., “everything” outside this forward light cone will be left
unaltered by any change in this choice.
This relativistic causality property is a key feature of relativistic field
theories in flat Minkowsky spacetime: it is all the causality that the orthodox
pragmatic quantum philosophy calls for.
But notice that by “everything” one means, in the quantum case, merely
the “expectation values”, which are averages over an (in principle) infinite
ensemble of instances.
Now, one might think that since this relativistic causality property holds
for these averages it ought to be at least conceivably possible that it could
hold also for the individual instances.
But the amazing thing is that this is not true! It is not logically possible
to impose the no-faster-than-light condition in the individual instances, and
maintain also the validity of certain simple predictions of quantum theory.
The point is this. Suppose one considers an experimental situation involv-
ing two experimental regions that are spacelike separated from each other.
This means that no point in either region can be reached from any point in
the other without traveling faster than the speed of light. In the first region
there is an experimenter who can freely choose to do one experiment or an-
other. Each of these two alternative possible experiments has two alternative
possible outcomes. There is a similar set up in the second region. Each pos-
sible outcome is confined to the associated experimental region, so that no
outcome of an experiment in one region should be able to be influenced by
the free choice made by the experimenter in the other region.
One single instance is considered, but with the two free choices of the
two experimenters being treated as two free variables. Thus the one single
instance under consideration, uniquely fixed at all times earlier than the
earliest time in either of the two experimental regions, will go into one or
another of altogether (2 × 2) = four alternative possible evolutions of this
system, depending on which of the two alternative possible choices is made
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by each of the two experimenters. There can then be further branchings that
are specified by which of the possible outcomes nature selects for whichever
experiments are performed.
The particular experimental details can be arranged so that the assumed
validity of the predictions of quantum theory for that particular arrangement
entails the nonvalidity of at least one of the three following locality conditions:
LOC1: It is possible to impose the following condition: If in each of the
two regions the first of the two possible experiments were to be performed,
and a certain result r appeared in the first region then if this very same
experiment were to be performed in the first region then this same result r
would appear there even if the experimenter in the second region were to
elect at the last moment to do the other measurement.
The rationale for this locality condition is that a free choice of what
to do in one place cannot—relativity theory leads us to believe— affect,
at a speed faster than the speed of light, what occurs elsewhere: making a
different choice in one region should not be able to force what appears (at the
macroscopic, observable level) in the other region to be different. Indeed, in
some frame of reference the outcome in the first region has already occurred
before the experimenter in the second region makes his free choice of which
experiment he will perform. But, according to ideas from relativity theory,
what someone has already seen and recorded here at some earlier time cannot
be disturbed by what a faraway experimenter freely chooses to do at some
later time.
Notice that LOC1 requires only that it be possible to impose this condi-
tion. The point is that only one of the two possible experiments can actually
be performed in the second region, and hence nature herself will make only
one choice. So what would actually appear in the first region if the exper-
imenter in the other (far away) region were (at some future time) to make
a different choice in not physically well defined. Thus this is a theoretical
investigation: the question is whether the predictions of QT are compatible
with the notion that nature evolves in such a way that what one observer
15
sees and records in the past can be imagined to be fixed independently of
what another person will freely choose to do in the future.
LOC2: Suppose, under the condition that the first of the two possible
measurements were to be performed in the first region (with no condition
imposed on what the outcome there is) that one can prove from LOC1 and
the predictions of quantum theory, the truth of a statement S that pertains
exclusively to what experimenters can observe under various possible condi-
tions of their own making in the second region. Then this locality condition
asserts that it is logically possible to demand that S remain true under the
condition that the experimenter in the first region freely chooses (say in the
future) to perform there, instead, the second possible measurement.
The rationale is that, according to certain ideas from the theory of rel-
ativity, the truth of a statement that pertains to macroscopic conditions
that refer exclusively to one space-time region should not depend on what
someone far away freely chooses to do later.
LOC3 This is another form of LOC1: Altering the free choice in R leaves
any outcome in L undisturbed. [See Stapp, 1997]
The validity of the predictions of quantum theory in correlation situa-
tions like this are being regularly borne out. (...Most recently in a highly
publicized experiment using the Swiss telephone company optical fibers to
connect experimental regions that were 14 km apart, with the intent of mak-
ing important practical applications.) Thus it can, I believe, be confidently
assumed that the pertinent quantum predictions are valid. But in that case
one of the “locality conditions” described above must fail.
Before drawing any conclusions one must consider the impact or signif-
icance of the assumption that the experimenters’ choices can be treated as
“free variables”.
It is part of the orthodox quantum philosophy that the experimenters’
choices can and should be considered to stand outside the physical system
that is being examined. Bohr and Heisenberg argued that biological sys-
tems in general lie outside the domain covered by the pragmatic framework.
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But in any case, one thing is certain: the beautiful and elegant quantum
formalism is naturally suited to the idea that it represents a system that
is part of a bigger system that can extract information from it, where the
nature of the information being extracted from the subsystem is controlled
by things outside that subsystem, namely the observer and his instruments
of observation.
But even at a more intuititive level it seems that the decision-making
process of human experimenters are so complex and delicate, and so insulate-
able in principle, prior to the time of the examination, from the system that
they are about to examine, as to render their choices as to what to look for
effectively free, under appropriate conditions of isolation, from any influence
upon them by the system they are about to examine. So it would seem to be
safe, under appropriate conditions of prior isolation, to treat these choices as
if they were free from such influences even in a strictly deterministic universe.
In a quantum universe this move is even more reasonable, because the
choices could be governed by a quantum process, such as the decay of a radio-
active nucleus. Within the quantum theoretical framework each such decay
appears as a spontaneous random event. It is free of any “physical” cause,
where “physical” means something that is part of the physical world as that
world is described by the physical theory. Thus within both the deterministic
and stochastic contexts it seems reasonable to treat the choices to be made
by the experimenters as if they were free, in the sense of not being influenced
by the physical properties of the system that is about to be examined.
One caveat. The arguments require that meaning be given to a condition
such as: “If the experimenter in region one performs experiment one, and
the outcome that occurs there is outcome one”. This condition is nonsensical
in the Everett many-minds interpretation, because every outcome occurs. I
have excluded that interpretation from consideration on other grounds, which
are described in section 5.
The apparent failure of the locality condition has three important conse-
quences:
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1. It gives a solid basis for the conclusion of the founders of quantum
theory that no return to the notions of classical mechanics (relativistic field
theory) is possible: the invalid locality property certainly holds in relativistic
classical mechanics.
2. It makes reasonable the attempt to ontologicalize the orthodox inter-
pretation. It had formerly been believed that this was a nonsensical thing to
try, because ontologicalization immediately entails faster-than-light transfer
of information on the individual-instance level. Such transfers had seemed
unacceptable, but are now seen to be unavoidable even in a very general
framework that maintains merely the validity of the predictions of quantum
theory, and the idea that the experimenters’ choices can be considered to be
“free”, in the weak sense discussed above.
3. Because the nonlocal effects enter into orthodox quantum theory specif-
ically in connection with the entry of our knowings into the dynamics there is
prima facie evidence that our knowings may be associated with the nonlocal
aspect of nature. It is worth noting that these effects are not confined to a
microscopic scale: in the Swiss experiment the effect in question extended
over a separation of 14km. And, according to quantum theory, the effect
does not fall off at all with distance. In my proposal each of our know-
ings is associated with a brain event that involves, as a unit, a pattern of
brain (e.g., neuronal) activity that may extend over a large part of the brain.
The collapse actualizes this whole pattern, and the associated knowing is an
expression of the functional properties of this pattern.
Once the reality is recognized to be knowledge, rather than substan-
tive matter, the nonlocal connections seem less problemmatic: nothing but
knowledge about far-away knowings is changed by nearby knowings.
5. All Roads Lead to Solvay 1927.
The Solvay conference of 1927 marks the birth of (coherently formulated)
quantum theory. Two of the many important papers delivered there stand
out.
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Born and Heisenberg presented a paper on the mathematical formalism
and proclaimed that the essential features of the formalism were complete
and not subject to further revision.
Dirac gave a paper on the interpretation, and claimed that “the wave func-
tion represents our knowledge of the system, and the reduced wave packets
our more precise knowledge after measurement.”
These two parts, the mathematical formalism and its interpretation in
terms of knowledge, meshed perfectly: that was the logical basis of the
Copenhagen interpretation.
This was an epic event in the history of human thought. Since the time
of the ancient Greeks the central problem in understanding the nature of
reality, and our role in it, had been the puzzling separation of nature into
two seemingly very different parts, mind and matter. This had led to the
divergent approaches of idealism and materialism. According to the precepts
of idealism our ideas, thought, sensations, and other experiential realities
should be taken as basic. But then the mathematical structure carried by
matter was difficult to fathom in any natural way. Materialism, on the other
hand, claimed that matter was basic. But, if one started with matter then it
was difficult to understand how something like your experience of the redness
of a red apple could be constructed out of it, or why the experiential aspect
of reality should exist at all if, as classical mechanics avers, the material
aspect is dynamically complete by itself. There seemed to be no rationally
coherent way to comprehend the relationship between our experiences of
the reality that exists outside our thoughts, and the nonexperiential-type
material substance that the external reality was claimed to be made of.
Yet at the Solvay meeting, physicists, of all people, had come up with
a perfect blending, based on empirical evidence, in which the mathematical
structure needed to account for all of the empirical regularities formerly as-
cribed to substantive matter, was present without there being anything like
substantive matter: the mathematical structure was a property of knowings!
What an exhilerating moment it must have been. Driven simply by the
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need to understand in a rational way the empirical facts that nature had
presented to us, scientists had been led to a marvelous resolution of this most
fundamental of all philosophical problems. It was a tremendous achievement.
Now, seventy years later, we are able to gather here at the X-th Max Born
Symposium to celebrate the unbroken record of successes of that profound
discovery, and to hear about its important new triumphs.
So now, the end of our Symposium, I take this opportunity to review
briefly some of its highlights from the perspective of the Solvay breakthough.
Probably the most exciting reports were from experimentalists who are
now performing experiments that could only be imagined seventy years ago.
Yet the thinking of the founders of quantum theory did involve “gedanken”
experiments designed to confirm the rational coherency of the framework. To-
day these “thought” experiments involving preparations and measurements
on small numbers of individual atoms are being carried out, and the results
invariably confirm all of the “quantum weirdness” that the Copenhagen in-
terpretation predicted.
But do these successes really confirm the radical ideas of Solvay 1927?
Time has eroded the message of Solvay to the extent that the scientist per-
forming the experiments hardly recognize the Solvay insights in the interpre-
tation of their work, though they give lip service to it. One must probe into
the rational foundations of the subject to see the import of their results on
this deep question.
I cite first the report of Omnes. There had been hope that some way
around the Copenhagen interpretation would emerge from the studies of
decoherence and consistent histories that have been so vigorously pursued of
late. No one has pursued these ideas more deeply than Omnes. His verdict is
that these methods amount to “the Copenhagen interpretation ‘done right’
”. He said similar things in his book (Omnes, 1994). And such prominent
proponents of “decoherence” as Zurek(1986) and Joos(1986) have said similar
things: Zurek concluded that the study of decoherence “constitutes a useful
addition to the Copenhagen ...a clue pointing at a still more satisfactory
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resolution of the measurement problem...a hint about how to proceed rather
than the means to settle the matter quickly.” Joos asks at the beginning of
his article “Is there some way, at least a hint, how to understand... ” and
at the end says “one may hope that these superselection rules can be helpful
in developing new ideas ..[about].. measurement processes.” So they both
stressed that decoherence effects do not resolve the deep problems.
Indeed, decoherence is rather the cause of the problem: decoherence ef-
fects make it virtually impossible to empirically determine whether quantum
collapses are occurring outside our brains or not. It is precisely because of
decoherence effects that we cannot tell, empirically, whether or not collapses
actually do occur “when the interaction of the object with the measuring
device, and hence the rest of the world, comes into play”.
The decoherence-consistent-histories approach had originally been pur-
sued within the Everett framework, and indeed was sometimes called the
‘post-Everett’ approach to stress that it was being pursued within that frame-
work, rather than the Copenhagen framework, which it sought to unseat. But
Omnes put his finger on the fatal flaw in the Everett approach when he said
that it did not explain the transition from “and” to “or”. In the evolving
wave function of Everett the various branches do evolve independently, and
hence might naturally be imagined to have different “minds” associated with
them, as Everett suggests. But these branches, and the minds that are imag-
ined to be properties of these branches, are all simultaneously present. Hence
there is no way to give meaning to the notion that one mind is far more likely
to be present at some finite time than the others. It is like waves on a pond:
the big waves and the small ones are all present simultaneously. So one needs
something else, perhaps like a surfer that will be pushed into one branch or
the other, to define the “or” that is logically needed to define the notion of the
probabilities of the different “alternatives”. Yet the Everett interpretation
allows nothing else besides the wave function and its properties. So all the
minds are simultaneously present because all the corresponding properties of
the various branches are simultaneously present.
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The idea of the surfer being pushed by the wave is exactly the idea behind
the model of David Bohm that was so ably expounded here by D. Duerr and
by F. Faisal. But the model has not been consistently extended to the rel-
ativistic case of quantum electrodynamics, or to quantum chromodynamics,
which are our premiere quantum theories.
The model has other unpleasant features. One is the problem of the empty
branches. Each time a “good measurement” is performed the wave function
must separate into different “branches”. These branches are parts of the
wave function such that the full wave function is a sum (i.e., superposition)
of these branches, and each branch is nonzero only in a region (of the 3n-
dimensional space in which these wave functions live) that overlaps none of
the other regions. Here n is the number of particles in the universe.
If two branches separate then the ‘surfer’ (which in the Bohm model
would be the entire classically described physical world) must end up in just
one of these branches. But all the other branches (which are regarded as
physically real) must continue to evolve for all eternity without ever having
any effect upon the ‘surfer’, which is the only part of reality that is directly
connected to human experience, according to the model. This seems wildly
extravagant! If the surfer is the important thing then the effort of nature to
continue to evolve these ineffectual branches for all eternity seems to be a
gigantic waste of effort. But if the surfer is not important then why is this
tiny part of reality there at all? It does nothing but get pushed around.
There is a perhaps bigger problem with the initial conditions. The model
is predicated on the premise that the single real classical world is a random
element in a statistical ensemble of possibilities. The idea of a statistical
ensemble makes good sense when we have the possibility of repeated prepa-
rations of similar situations. But when we are speaking about the entire
universe it does not seem to make sense to speak of a particular statistical
ensemble of universes with some particular density (weight) function if only
one of them is ever created. Or are we supposed to think that a whole en-
semble of real classical worlds is created, and that “our” real world is just
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one of them? That would seem to be the more natural interpretation. But
I asked David Bohm about that, many years ago, and he insisted that there
was, according to his thinking, only one universe.
Bohm was stimulated to construct his model by conversations with Ein-
stein. Yet Einstein rejected the model, calling it “too cheap”.
I asked Bohm what he thought about Einstein’s evaluation, and he said
he completely agreed.
Indeed, at the end of his book with Hiley about his model, after finishing
the part describing the model, he added two chapters about going beyond
the model. He motivated those chapters by references to the efforts that
I was making, and that Gell-mann and Hartle were making, to go beyond
the Copenhagen interpretation. Gell-mann and Hartle were pursuing the
decoherence-consistent-histories approach mentioned above, which has led
back to Solvay, and I had proposed a theory of events. The events were real
collapses of a wave function that was considered to be ontologically real.
This brings me to the talk of Rudolf Haag. Haag described his theory
of events, and mentioned that it still needed twenty years of work. In his
written account Haag(1996) mentions that I had proposed essentially the
same theory in the seventies, some twenty years ago (Stapp, 1975, 1977,
1979). My twenty years of work on this idea has lead back to Solvay 1927.
The problem is always the same: if one wants to make natural use of what
nature has told us, namely that the beautiful mathematical formalism works
to high precision, then one is led to ascribe to that formalism some ontological
reality. But then the condition for the collapses must be spelled out in detail.
It is natural for physicists to try to find purely physical conditions. But in
the end there are no adequate natural conditions of this kind: the possibili-
ties are all unnatural and ad hoc. Von Neumann said it all when he showed,
back in the thirties, that one could push the boundary between the world
described by the quantum formalism and the world described in terms our
classical concepts all the way to the boundary between brain and mind with-
out disrupting the predictions of quantum theory, and noted that there is no
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other natural place to put the boundary, without disrupting the integrity of
the theory. In fact, it is, in principle, only if one pushes the boundary all
way to the brain-mind interface that one obtains, strictly, the prediction of
orthodox quantum theory: otherwise there are rogue collapses that are not
associated with knowings.
Of course, pushing the boundary all the way to mind brings mind into
our theory of nature. But why on earth should we try to keep mind out—
bottled up, ignored, and isolated from the physical world—when we know it
is present, and seemingly efficacious, particularly when the intense struggle
of physicists to find a rational way of accounting for the observed phenomena
led them to the conclusion that the theory of physical reality has the form
of a theory about knowings, not the form of a theory about matter. Our
aim should be not to bring back moribund matter, which we are well rid
of, but to learn how better to understand knowings, within the mathmatical
framework provided for them by the quantum formalism.
6. The Two Quantum Processes.
There have been many attempts by physicists to ‘get mind back out of
physics’: i.e., to reverse the contamination of physics brought in by Bohr,
Heisenberg, Dirac, Pauli and company in 1927. I believe those decontamina-
tion efforts have failed, even though I myself have worked hard to achieve it.
So I am taking here the other tack, and trying to build a coherent ontology
around the orthodox ideas. In particular, I am accepting as basic the idea
that there are knowings, and that each such knowing occurs in conjunction
with a collapse of the wave function that reduces it to a form concordant
with that knowing. I assume that knowings are not associated exclusively
with human body/brains. But I shall focus here on these particular kinds of
knowings because these are the ones we know most about.
A fundamental fact of orthodox quantum theory is that the evolution of
the state of the physical system between the collapse events is mathematically
very different from the evolution of this state associated with the collapses:
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the former are “unitary” and “local”, whereas the latter are neither.
The “unitarity” property means several things. On the one hand, it means
that the evolution is in some sense no change at all: the internal or intrinsic
structure of the state is unaltered. One can imagine that only the ‘mode of
description’ of the state is changed, not the state itself. Indeed, that point
of view is very often adopted in quantum theory, and is the one I shall adopt
here. (See the next section.)
The “unitarity” property also means that the transformation operator
that changes the state at an earlier time to the state at a later time does not
depend on that initial (or final) state: there is, in this sense, in connection
with the unitary part of the process of evolution, no self reference!
According to the orthodox interpretation, there is no experiential reality
associated with the unitary part of the evolution, which is the part between
the observations: there is no essential change, and no self reference, and
hence, reasonably enough, no experience.
Experiences are associated only with the nonunitary parts of the evolu-
tion: the part associated with observations. For that part there is essential
change, and the transformation operator analogous to the one defined for
the unitary case would depend on the state upon which it acts. Thus there
would be, in this sense, self-reference. This self reference (nonlinearity) plays
a key role in the dynamics associated with observation. It is a special kind
of self reference that has no counterpart in classical mechanics.
In the classical approximation to the quantum dynamics only the unitary
part of the dynamical evolution survives. So from a quantum mechanical
point of view it would be nonsensical to look for mind in a system described
by classical physics. For classical physics is the result of an approximation to
the full dynamical process of nature that eliminates the part of that process
that orthodox quantum theory says is associated with our experiences.
7. The Two Times: Process Time and Mathematical Time
The distinctions between the two processes described above is central to
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this work. It can be clarified, and made more vivid, by explaining how these
two processes can be considered to take place in two different times.
In quantum theory there are two very different kinds of mathematical
objects: vectors and operators. Operators operate on vectors: the action of
an operator on a vector changes it to another (generally different) vector.
Given an operator, and a vector that represents a state of a physical
system (perhaps the entire universe), a number is formed by first letting
the operator act on the vector, and then multipling the resulting vector by
the (complex conjugate of the) original vector. This number is called the
“expectation value of the operator in the state represented by that vector”.
Modern field theories are generally expressed in the so-called Heisenberg
picture (rather than the so-called Schroedinger picture). I shall follow that
practice.
In ordinary relativistic quantum field theory each spacetime point has a
collection of associated operators. (I gloss over some technicalities that are
not important in the present context.)
Consider the collection of operators C(t) formed by taking all of the
operator associated with all of the spacetime points that lie at fixed time t.
This set C(t) is “complete” in the sense that the expectation values of all
the operators of C(t) in a state S determine all the expectation values of the
all the operators in C(t′) in the state S, for every time t′. The operators in
C(t) are related to those in C(t′) by a unitary transformation. Whether one
represents the state S by giving the expectation values in this state of all the
operators in C(t), or of all the operators in C(t′), is very much like choosing
to use one coordinate system or another to describe a given situation: it is
just a matter of viewpoint. The unitary transformation that relates the col-
lection of operators C(t) to the collection of operators C(t′) is essentially the
unitary transformation associated with the Schroedinger-directed temporal
evolution. It is in this sense that the unitary transformation that generates
evolution in the “mathematical time” t is relatively trivial. It is determin-
istic, continuous, invertible, and independent of the state S of the physical
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system upon which the operators act.
But giving the complete set of all the operators associated with all the
points in spacetime says nothing at all about the evolution of the state! Say-
ing everything that can be said about the operators themselves, and about
evolution via the unitary part of the transformation has merely fixed the
mode of description, and the connections between different modes of descrip-
tion. It has not said anything about the all-important evolution of the state.
The state undergoes a sequence of abrupt jumps:
...Si −→ Si+1 −→ Si+2....
The situation can be displayed graphically by imagining that i is the
imaginary part of the complex time t: the evolution proceeds at constant
imaginary part of t equal i, and at constant Si, with the real part of t
increasing until it reaches a certain ‘jump time’ ti, whereupon there is an
abrupt quantum jump to a new constant state Si+1, and a new constant
imaginary part of t equal to i + 1, and the evolution then again proceeds
with increasing real part of t until the next ‘jump value’ ti+1 is reached,
and then there is another jump up to a new value, i + 2, of the imaginary
part of t. Thus the full process is represented in complex time as a line
having the shape of a flight of steps. The horizontal segments where the real
part of time is increasing represent the trivial unitary parts of the process,
which correspond merely to changing the viewpoint, or mode of description,
with the state remaining fixed, and with no associated experience. The
vertical segments correspond to increases in ‘process time’. These are the
parts associated with experience. (This identification of the vertical axis
with imaginary time is purely pedagogical)
The present endeavour is to begin to fill in the details of the process
associated with the increases in the vertical coordinate, process time, which
is the time associated with the nontrivial part of the evolutionary process,
and with experience. The final phase of each vertical segment is the fixing of a
new knowing. But some process in Nature must bring about this particular
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fixing: this process is represented by motion along the associated vertical
segment.
8. Quantum Ontology
What is the connection between the our experiences and the physicists’
theoretical description of the physical world?
The materialist position is that each experience is some aspect of the
matter from which the physicists say the world is built.
But the physical world certainly is not built out of the substantive matter
that was postulate to exist by classical mechanics. Such stuff simply does
not exist, hence our experiences cannot be built out of it.
The quantum analog of physical reality, namely the quantum state S
of the universe, is more like information and ideas than like the matter of
classical physics: it consist of accumulated knowledge. It changes when
human knowledge changes, and is tied to intentionality, as I shall explain
presently.
Orthodox classical mechanics is naturally complete in itself: the physical
world represented in it is dynamically complete, and there is no hint within
its structure of the existence of anything else.
Orthodox quantum mechanics is just the opposite: the physical world
represented by it is not dynamically complete. There is a manifest need for
a process that is not represented within the orthodox description.
In orthodox quantum mechanics the basic realities are our knowings. The
dynamics of the physical world represented in the orthodox quantum for-
malism is not internally complete because there is, in connection with each
knowing, a collapse process that appears in the orthodox theory as a “random
choice” between alternative possibilities: contemporary quantum theory pro-
vides no description of the process that selects the particular knowing that
actually occurs.
This collapse process, which is implemented by a nonunitary/nonlocal
transformation, must specify two things that the contemporary machinery of
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quantum theory does specify:
1. It must specify an experience E, associated with a corresponding pro-
jection operator P(E), such that the question is put to Nature: “Does E
occur?”
2. It must then select either the answer ‘yes’, and accordingly change the
current state (i.e., density matrix) S to the state PSP, or select the answer
‘no’, and accordingly replace S by (1-P)S(1-P). The probability of answering
‘yes’ is Trace PSP/TraceS; the probability of answering ‘no’ is Trace (1-
P)S(1-P)/Trace S.
In the orthodox pragmatic interpretation the step 1 is achieved by a
human experimenter’s putting in place a device whose observed response will
determine whether the system that is being examined has a certain property
specified by P(E): the occurrence of experience E will confirm, basically on
the basis of past experience, that future experiences will be likely to conform
to the answer “Yes, the system has property P(E).”
According to the orthodox viewpoint, the experimenter stands outside the
quantum system being examined, and the device is regarded as an extension
of himself.
Step 2 is then achieved by appeal to a random selection process that
picks the answer ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ in accordance with a statistical rule. This
selection process (also) is not represented within the orthodox Hilbert space
description.
How can these two steps be comprehended in a rational, minimalistic,
naturalistic way?
9. Von Neumann’s Process I.
The first step in the nonunitary process is what von Neumann called
Process I, in contrast to his Process II, which is the normal unitary evolution.
Process I consists of “posing the next question”. We can suppose that the
possible answers are Y es or No. Nature will then answer the question. The
crucial requirement is that the answer Y es must be recognizably different
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from the answer No, which includes no recognizable answer at all.
In practice a human being creates the conditions for Process I, and it is
he who recognizes the positive response: this recognition is a knowing.
For example, the observer may know that he is seeing the pointer on
the device—that he himself has set in plac—resting definitely between the
numbers 6 and 7 on the dial. This is a complex thing that he knows. But
knowings can be known, at least in part, by later knowings. This is the sort
of knowing that science is built upon. Of course, all one can really know is
that one’s experiences are of a certain kind, not that there really is a pointer
out there. So we expect the knowings to correspond in some way to a brain
activity of some sort, which under normal circumstances would be an effect
of something going on outside the brain.
Von Neumann accepts the statistical character of the theory, and his
Process I is statistical in character: his Process I covers merely the posing
of the question, and the assignment of a statistical weight to each of the
recognizably different alternative possible answers. It does not cover the
subsequent process whereby Nature delivers an answer.
My basic commitment here is to accept the quantum principles as they
are, rather than to invent new principles that would allow us to exclude
mind from Nature’s dynamics. So I accept here, ontologically as well as
pragmatically, that the possibilities singled out in Process I are defined by
different ‘possible knowings’.
Two important features of the von Neumann Process I are:
1) It produces an abrupt increase in entropy. If the state of the universe
prior to the process is well defined, so that the entropy (with no coarse
graining) is zero, then if, for example, the Process I gives a statistical mixture
with 50% Y es and 50% No, the entropy will jump to ln2.
2) It is quasi-local. There will be nonlocal aspects extending over the
size of the examined system, but no long-range nonlocal effects of the kind
mentioned in section 3. That is, there will be, for the Process I associated
with a human knowings, brain-sized nonlocal effects associated with defining
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the question, but no nonlocal effects extending outside the body/brain. Thus
Process I is, for human knowings, a human process, not a global one. [Tech-
nically, the reason that there is no effect on far-away systems is that such
an effect is computed by performing a ‘trace’ over the degrees of freedom of
the nearby system (e.g., the brain/body), but von Neumann’s Process I is
achieved by dropping out interference terms between the alternative possible
answers, and that operation leaves this trace unaltered.]
Process I lies at the root of measurement and mind-body problems. In
approaches that try to explain Process I in purely physical terms, with know-
ings not mentioned, but rather forced to follow from physically characterized
processes, the answers tend to assert either that:
1), the wave function of a particle occasionally just spontaneously reduces to
a wave function that is essentially zero except over a small region, or that
2), what is not measurable in practice (i.e., via some practicable procedure)
does not exist in principle: if it is impractical to detect an interference term
them it does not exist.
This latter sort of rule is certainly justified in a pragmatic approach. But
most physicists have been reluctant to accept such rules at the ontological
level. Hence the pragmatic approach has won by default.
From the present standpoint, however, the basic principle is that Na-
ture responds only to questions that are first posed, and whose answers are
possible knowings, or are things of the same general ontological type as pos-
sible knowings. [The needed generalization will be discussed later, after the
knowings themselves have been discussed.]
But the important immediate point is that the quantum dynamics is
organized so as to put knowings, and their possible generalizations, into the
central position.
All such knowings contribute to the general self knowledge of the universe,
which is represented by the (Hilbert-space) state S of the universe.
10. Origin of the Statisical Rules
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Without loss of generality we can suppose that each posed question is
a single question answered with a single reply, Yes or No. Then the usual
(density matrix) formalism allows the reduction process to be formalized in
the following way. The state of the universe is represented by the density
matrix (operator) S. The question is represented by the projection operator
P : P 2 = P . Then the von Neumann Process I is represented by
S ≡ [PSP+(1−P )S(1−P )+PS(1−P )+(1−P )SP ]−→ PSP+(1−P )S(1−P ).
The subsequent completion of the reduction is then represented by
[PSP + (1− P )S(1− P )] −→ PSP or (1− P )S(1− P )
where the fractions of the instances giving the two results are:
(TrPSP )/(TrPSP + Tr(1− P )S(1− P )) for PSP
and
(Tr(1− P )S(1− P ))/(TrPSP + Tr(1− P )S(1− P )) for (1− P )S(1− P ).
Here Tr represents the trace operation, which instructs one to sum up the
diagonal elements < i|M |i > of the matrix < j|M |i > that represents the
operator, for some complete orthonormal set of states |i >. [The value of the
trace does not depend upon which complete orthonormal set is used, and, for
any two (bounded) operators A and B, TrAB = TrBA. Using this property,
and P 2 = P , one sees that the denominator in the two equations just given
reduces to TrS. A partial trace is given by the same formula, but with the
vectors |i > now forming a complete orthonormal basis for part of the full
system]
I believe it is perfectly acceptable to introduce an unexplained random
choice or selection in a pragmatically formulated theory. But in a rational
ontological approach there must be some sufficient cause or reason for a
selection to pick out Y es rather than No, or vice versa. In view of the
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manifestly nonlocal character of the reduction process, there is, however, no
reason for this selection to be determined locally.
Quantum theory does not specify what this selection process is, and I
do not try to do so. But given our ignorance of what this process is, it is
highly plausible that it should give statistical results in accord with the rules
specified above. The reason is this.
If the selection process depends in some unknown way on things outside
the system being examined then the fractions ought to be invariant under a
huge class of unitary transformations U of the state S that leave P invariant,
for these transformations are essentially the trivial rearrangements of the
distant features of the universe:
S −→ USU−1 U−1PU = P.
Since the statistical description after the Process I has occurred is es-
sentially similar to the classical statistical description one should expect S
and P (or (1 − P )) to enter linearly. But the trace formulas are the only
possibilities that satisfy these conditions, for all U that leave P invariant.
The point here is only that if the actual selection process depends in a
complicated and unknown way on distant uncontrolled properties of S then
the long-term averages should not be sensitive to basically trivial rearrange-
ments made far away.
This assumption is quite analogous to the assumption made in classical
statistical analysis—which has a deterministic underpinning—that in the ab-
sence of information about the full details one should integrate over phase
space without any weighting factor other than precisely one in those degrees
of freedom about which one has no information. Thus the quantum statisti-
cal rules need not be regarded as some mysterious property of nature to have
unanalysable tendencies to make sudden random jumps: it is rational to sup-
pose, within an ontological setting, that there is a causal, though certainly
nonlocal, underpinning to these choices, but that we do not yet know any-
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thing about it, and hence our ignorance must be expressed by the uniquely
appropriate averaging over the degrees of freedom about which we have no
knowledge.
The effective randomness of Nature’s answers does not render the our
knowings nonefficacious. Our knowings can enter the dynamics in a strongly
controlling way through the choice of the questions, even though the answers
to these questions are effectively random. The formation of the questions,
in Process I, is human based, even though the selection of the answers is
presumably global. This will be discussed presently.
The theory is naturalistic in that, although there are knowings, there are
no soul-like experiencers: each human stream of consciousness belongs to a
human body/brain, which provides the structure that links the experiences
of that stream tightly together.
11. Brains and Experiences.
The dynamics of the theory is organized around the collection of opera-
tors P(E) that connect experiences E to their effects on the state S of the
universe. I describe here my conception of this connection, and of the dy-
namical differences between the quantum version of this connection and its
classical analog.
Each experience is supposed to be one gestalt that, like a percept, “comes
totally or not at all”, in the words of Wm. James (1987. p. 1061). This ex-
perience is part of a sequence whose elements are, according to James, linked
together in two ways: each consists of a fringe that changes only very slowly
from one experience to the next, and a focal part that changes more rapidly.
The fringe provides the stable contextual framework. It is the background
that provides both the contextual setting, within which the foreground is
set, and the experience of a persisting historical self that provides both the
backdrop for the focal part and the carrier of longer term motivations. The
focal part has a sequence of temporally displaced components that, like the
rows of a marching band that are currently in front of the viewing stand,
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consists of some that are just coming into consciousness, some that are at
the center, and some that are fading out. The occurrence together, in each
instantaneous experience, of this sequence of temporal components is what
allows comparisons to be made within a conscious experience. Judgments
about courses of events can be parts of an experiences. The experiences are
organized in the first instance, around experiences of the person’s body in
the context of his environment, and later also around abstractions from those
primitive elements. These matters are discussed in more detail in chapter VI
of my book (Stapp ,1993).
Each experience normally has a feel that includes an experience of a pro-
longation of the current sequence of temporal components: this prolongation
will normally be a prolongation that is, on the basis of past experience, likely
to be imbedded in the “current sequence of temporal components” of some
later experience in the linked sequence of experiences.
Each experience E induces a change of the state of the universe S–> PSP.
This change will, I believe, for reasons I will describe presently, be a specifi-
cation of the classical part (see below) of the electro-magnetic field within the
brain of the person. This specification will fix the activities of the brain in
such a way as to produce a coordinated activity that will generally produce,
via a causal chain in the physical world (i.e., via the causal evolution specified
by the Schroedinger or Heisenberg equations of motion) the potentialities for
the next experience, E ′. That causal chain may pass, via the motor cortex,
to muscle action, to effects on the environment, to effects on sensors, to ef-
fects on the brain, and finally to a set of potentialities for various possible
prolongations of the current sequence of temporal components.
Then a selection must be made: one of the potential experiences will
become actual.
But this description glosses over an essential basic problem: How do
the possible experiences E and the associations E–> P(E) get characterized
and created in the first place. There is an infinite continuum of projection
operators P such that S–> PSP would generate a new state. Why are some
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particular P’s given favored status, and why are these favored P’s associated
with “experiences”?
This favored status is this: some one of these favored P’s will be picked
out from the continuum of possibilities, in conjunction with the next phase
of the dynamical process. This next phase is the putting to Nature of the
question: Does the current state S jump to PSP or not?
To provide some basis for getting the universe going in a way that tends
to produce stable or enduring structure, instead of mere chaotic random
activity, I assume that a basic characteristic of the underlying dynamics is to
select only projectors P that impose a certain repetitiveness on the dynamical
structure. These qualities of repetitiveness are assumed to be fundamental
qualities of the projectors. But each such quality is a characteristic that is
more general in its nature than any particular realization of it. These general
qualities I call “feels”: they encompass all human experiences, but extend
far beyond.
Thus the basic assumption is that certain projectors P have “feels”, but
most do not, where a “feel” is a generalized version of a human experience.
Each feel is characterized by a quality of repetitiveness, and the actualiza-
tion of this feel entails the actualization of some particular realization of
that quality or pattern of repetitiveness within the dynamical structure that
constitutes the universe. This actualization is expressed by the transforma-
tion S–> PSP where P = P(E), and E is the feel: it is the quality of the
repetitiveness that is being actualized.
This general tendency to produce repetitive spatio-temporal patterns car-
ries over to human experience, and will, I believe, be greatly enhanced by
natural selection within the biological sphere. Thus the selection, from among
the proferred potential experiences, of the next E ′, will be such as to favor a
sequences E–> P(E)–> E ′ such that E ′ is either the same as E, or at least
the same as E in some essential way. Thus experiences, and their more gen-
eral ontological cousins, feels, are tied to the generation of self-reproducing
structures. This generation of regenerating/reverberating stable structures
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underlies quantum dynamics, in the form of the creation by the dynamics
of stable and quasi-stable particles, and extends beyond human beings, both
to biological systems in general, and even to the overall organization of the
universe, according to the ideas being developed here.
As regards this repetitiveness, it is undoubtedly pertinent that classical
mechanics is formulated basically in space-time, with lawfulness expressed
essentially by a static or quasi-static quality of momentum-energy. But the
essence of the transition to quantum theory is precisely that this static quality
of momentum-energy is replaced by a repetitive quality, by a characteristic
oscillatory behavior’: quantum theory is basically about repetitive regenera-
tion.
In line with all this, I assume that the projection operators P act by
specifying the (expectation values of the) quantum elecromagetic field. There
are many reason for believing that this is the way nature operates:
1. The EM fields naturally integrate the effects of the motions of the
billions of ions and electrons that are responsible for our neural processes.
Thus examining the EM fields provide a natural way of examining the state
of the brain, and selecting a state of the EM field of the brain provides a
natural way of controlling the behavior of the brain.
2. The EM field has marvelous properties as regards connections to clas-
sical physics. The bulk of the low-energy EM state automatically organizes
itself into a superposition of “coherent states”, each of which is described by a
classical electromagnetic field, and which enjoys many properties of this clas-
sical elecromagnetic field. These “classical” states are brought into the dy-
namical structure in a natural way: the condition that each actually realized
state will correspond to essentially a single one of these classically describable
coherent states is what is needed to deal effectively, in a physically realis-
tic way, with the infra-red divergence problem in quantum electro-dynamics.
[See Stapp (1983), and Kawai and Stapp (1995)]
3, These “classical” states (coherent states) of the quantum EM field are
robust (not easily disrupted by the thermal and random noises in a warm
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wet brain): they are ideal for use in generating self-reproducing effects in a
warm, wet, noisy enviroment. [See Stapp (1987), (1993, p.130), and Zurek
(1993)]
4. These classical states are described by giving the ampitudes in each
of the oscillatory modes of the field: spacetime structure arises from phase
relationships among the different oscillatory modes.
Although the theory being developed here maintains a close connection
to classical physics, its logical and ontological structure is very different. In
classical physics the dynamics is governed entirely by myopic local rules: i.e.,
by rules that specify the evolution of everything in the universe by making
each local variable respond only to the physical variables in its immediate
neighborhood. Human experiences are thus epiphenomenal in the sense that
they do not need to be recognized as entities that play any dynamical role:
the local microscopic description, and the local laws, are sufficient to spec-
ify completely the evolution of the state of physical universe. Experiential
gestalts can regarded as mere effects of local dynamical causes, not as essen-
tial elements in the causal progession.
But the most profound lesson about nature learned in the twentieth cen-
tury is that the empirically revealed structure of natural phenomena cannot
be comprehended in terms of any local dynamics: natural phenomena are
strictly incompatible with the idea that the underlying dynamics is local.
The second most profound lesson is that the known observed regulari-
ties of natural phenomena can be comprehended in terms of a mathematical
model built on a structure that behaves like representations of knowledge,
rather than representations of matter of the kind postulated to exist in clas-
sical mechanics: the carrier of the structure that accounts for the regularities
in nature that were formerly explained by classical physical theory is, ac-
cording to contempory theory, more idealike than matterlike, although it
does exhibit a precise mathematical structure.
The third essential lesson is that this new description, although complete
in important practical or pragmatic ways, is, as an ontological description,
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incomplete: there is room for additional specifications, and indeed an abso-
lute need for additional specifications if answers are to be given to questions
about how our experiences come to be what they are. The presently known
rules simply do not fix this aspect of the dynamics. The purpose of work is
to make a first stab at filling this lacuna.
One key point, here, is that brains are so highly interconnected that it
will generally be only large macroscopic structures that have a good chance
of initiating a causal sequence that will be self-reproductive. So each pos-
sible experience E should correspond to a P(E) that creates a macroscopic
repetitiveness in the states of a brain.
A second key point is that our knowings/experiences can be efficacious
not only in the sense that they select, in each individual case, what actu-
ally happens in that case, but also in the statistical sense that the rules
that determine which questions are put to Nature, can skew the statistical
properties, even if the answers to the posed questions follow the quantum
statistical rules exactly. I turn now to a discussion of this point and its
important consequences.
12. Measurements, Observations, and Experiences.
A key question is whether, in a warm wet brain, collapses associated
with knowings would have any effects that are different from what would
be predicted by classical theory, or more precisely, by a Bohm-type theory.
Bohm’s theory yields all the predictions of quantum theory in a way that,
like classical mechanics, makes consciousness epiphenomenal: the flow of
consciousness is governed deterministically (but nonlocally) by a state of the
universe that evolves, without regard to consciousness, in accordance with
local deterministic equations of motion. Bohm’s theory, like classical physics,
tacitly assumes a connection between consciousness and brain activity, but
the details of this connection are not specified.
The aim of the present work is to specify this connection, starting from the
premise that the quantum state of the universe is essentially a compendium
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of knowledge, of some general sort, which includes all human knowledge, as
contrasted to something that is basically mechanical, and independent of
human knowledge, like the quantum state in Bohmian mechanics.
I distinguish a “Heisenberg collapse”, S–> PSP or S–> (1-P)S(1-P), from
a “von Neumann collapse” S–>[PSP + (1-P)S(1-P)]. The latter can be re-
garded as either a precursor to the former, or a representation of the statisti-
cal effect of the collapse: i.e., the effect if one averages, with the appropriate
weighting, over the possible outcomes.
This latter sort of averaging would be pertinent if one wanted to examine
the observable consequences of assuming that a certain physical system is,
or alternatively is not, the locus of collapses.
This issue is a key question: Are there possible empirical distinctions
between the behaviors of systems that are—or alternatively are not— con-
trolled by high-level collapses of the kind that this theory associates with
consciousness. Can one empirically distinguish, on the basis of theoretical
principles, whether collapses of this kind are occurring within some system
that is purported to be conscious. This question is pertinent both to the
issue of whether some computer that we have built could, according to this
theory, be conscious, and also to the issue of whether our own behavior, as
viewed from the outside, has aspects that reveal the presence of the sort of
quantum collapses that this theory associates with consciousness.
This question about differences in behaviour at the statistical level feeds
also into the issue of whether being conscious has survival value. If behaviour
has, on the average, no dependence on whether or not collapses occur in the
system then the naturalistic idea that consciousness develops within biologi-
cal systems due to the enhancement of survival rates that the associated col-
lapses provide would become nonsense. Indeed, that idea is nonsense within
classical physics, for exactly this reason: whether conscious thoughts occur
in association with certain physical activities makes absolutely no difference
to the microlocally determined physical behavior of the system.
There are certain cases in which a von Neumann collapse, S–> [PSP
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+ (1-P)S(1-P)], would produce no observable effects on subsequent behav-
ior. To understand these conditions let us examine the process of measure-
ment/observation.
If one separates the degrees of freedom of the universe into those of “the
system being measured/observed”, and those of the rest of the universe, and
writes the state of the universe as
S = |Ψ >< Ψ|
with
|Ψ >=
∑
i
φiχi,
where the φi are states of “the system being measured/observed”, and the
χi are states of the rest of the universe, then since we observers are parts of
the rest of the universe it is reasonable to demand that if someone can have
an experience E then there should be a basis of orthonormal states χi such
that the corresponding projector P(E) is defined by
P (E)φi = φi
for all i,
P (E)χi = χi
for i in I(E), but
P (E)χi = 0,
otherwise, where I(E) is the set of indices i that label those states χi that
are compatible with experience E.
A “good measurement” is defined to be an interaction between the sys-
tem being measured and the rest of the universe such that the set of states
φi defined above with i in I(E) span a proper subspace of the space corre-
sponding to the measured system. In this case the knowledge that i is in the
set I(E) ensures that the state of the measured system lies in the subspace
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spanned by the set of states φi with i in I(E). That is, experience E would
provide knowledge about the measured system.
Let P be the projector that projects onto the subspace spanned by the
set of states φi with i in I(E). Then a von Neumann collapse with P in
place of P would be identical to the von Neumann collapse S–> [PSP +
(1-P)S(1-P)]. But then the observer would be unable to determine whether
a collapse associated with P occurred in the system, unbeknownst to him,
or whether, on the contrary, the definiteness of the observed outcome was
brought about by the collapse associated with his own experience. This is
essentially von Neumann’s conclusion.
But why should an actual collapse associated with the measured/observed
system correspond in this special way to a subsequent experience of some
human being? Why should an actually occurring P be such as to ensure an
equivalence between P and a P(E)?
Von Neumann’s approach to the measurement problem suggests that such
a connection would exist.
In both the von Neumann and Copenhagen approaches the measuring de-
vice plays a central role. Different perceptually distinguishable locations of
some “pointer” on the device are supposed to become correlated, during an
interaction between the measured system and the measuring device, to differ-
ent orthogonal subspaces of the Hilbert space of the measured system. This
perceptual distinctness of the possible pointer positions means that there is a
correlation between pointer locations and experiences. That connection must
be explained by the theory of consciousness, which is what is being devel-
oped here. But why, ontologically, as opposed to epistemologically, should
the projector P in the space of the measured/observed system be to a state
that is tied in this way to something outside self, namely the location of a
pointer on a measuring device with which it might have briefly interacted at
some earlier time.
Von Neumann did not try to answer this question ontologically. If the
real collapse were in the brain, and it corresponded to seeing the pointer at
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some one of the distinguishable locations, then from an epistemological point
of view the effect of this collapse would be equivalent to applying P to the
state of the measured/observed system.
If one works out from experiences and brains, in this way. one can formu-
late the collapses in terms of collapses out in the world, instead of inside the
brain, and largely circumvent (rather than resolve) the mind-brain problem.
Then the equivalence of the experience to the collapse at the level of the
measured/observed system would become true essentially by construction:
one defines the projectors at the level of the measured/observed system in a
way such that they correspond to the distinct perceptual possibilities.
But from a non-subjectivist viewpoint, one would like to have a charac-
terization of the conditions for the external collapse that do not refer in any
way to the observers.
One way to circumvent the observers is to use the fact that the pointer
interacts not only with observers but also with “the environment”, which is
imagined to be described by degrees freedom that will never be measured or
observed. The representation of S given above will again hold with the φi
now representing the states of the system being measured plus the measuring
device, and the χi corresponding to states of the environment.
The interaction between the pointer and the environment should quickly
cause all the χi that correspond to different distinct locations of the pointer
to become orthogonal.
All observable projectors P are supposed to act nontrivially only on the
states φi: they leave unchanged all of the environmental states χi.But then
all observable aspects of the state S reside in tr S, where tr stands for the
trace over the environmental degrees of freedom.
Let Pi be a projector onto an eigenstate of tr S. Suppose one postulates
that each of the allowed projectors P is a sum over some subset of the Pi,
or, equivalently that each possible P commutes with tr S, and is unity in
the space of the degrees of freedom of the environment.
This rule makes each allowed P project onto a statistical mixture of
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pointer locations, in cases where these locations are distinct. So it give the
sort of P’s that would correspond to what observers can observe, without
mentioning observers.
The P’s defined in this way commute with S. But then the effect of any
von Neumann reduction is to transform S into S: the von Neumann reduction
has no effect at all. The collapse would have no effect at all on the average
over the alternative possible answers to the question of whether or not the
collapse occurs. This nondependence of the average is of course an automatic
feature of classical statistical mechanics.
The theory being described here is a development of von Neumann’s ap-
proach in the sense that it gives more ontological reality to the quantum
state than the Copenhagen approach, and also in the sense that it follows
von Neumann’s suggestion (or what Wigner describes as von Neumann’s
suggestion) of bringing consciousness into the theory as a real player. But
it differs from the models discussed above that are based on his theory of
measurement. For it does not associate collapses with things like positions of
pointers on measuring devices. The projectors P(E) associated experiences E
are in terms of classical aspects of the electromagnetic fields in brains of ob-
servers. That would be in line with von Neumann’s general idea, but he did
not go into details about which aspects of the brain were the pertinent ones.
Rather he circumvented the issue of the mind-brain connection by centering
his attention on the external devices and their pointer-type variables.
The classical aspects of the EM field are technically different from pointers
because their interaction with the environment is mainly their interaction
with the ions and electrons of the brain, and these are the very interactions
that both create these aspects of these fields, and that are in part responsible
for the causal effects of the experiences E through the action of the projectors
P(E). So what was formerly an uncontrolled and unobservable environment
that disturbed the causal connections is now the very thing that creates
the coherent oscillatory structure through which our experiences control our
brains.
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The effects of this switch will be examined in the next section.
13. Efficacy of Knowings.
A formalism for dealing with the classical part of the the electro-magnetic
field, within quantum electrodynamics (QED), has been developed in Stapp
(1983) and Kawai and Stapp (1995), where it was shown that this part dom-
inates low-energy aspects, and is exactly expressed in terms of a unitary
operator that contains in a finite way the terms that, if not treated with
sufficient precision, lead to the famous infrared divergence problem in QED.
This classical part is a special kind of quantum state that has been studied
extensively. It is a so-called coherent state of the photon field. Essentially
all of the low-energy contributions are contained within it, and the effects
of emission and re-absorption are all included. However, different classically
conceived current sources produce different “classical fields”, and hence the
full low-energy field is a quantum superposition of these classical states.
Each such classical state is a combination (a product) of components each
of which has a definite frequency. All of the electrons and ions in the brain
contribute to each of these fixed frequency components, with an appropriate
weighting determined by that frequency. Thus the description is naturally in
the frequency domain, rather than in spacetime directly: spatial information
is encoded in quantum phases of the various fixed frequency components.
Each value is represented, actually, by a gaussian wave packet centered at
that value, in a certain space, and hence neighboring values are represented
by overlapping gaussian wave packets.
To exhibit a basic feature I consider a system of just three of these states.
Suppose state 2 has all of the correct timings to elicit some coordinated ac-
tions. It represents in this simple model the state singled out by the projector
P = P(E). Suppose it is dynamically linked to some motor state, represented
by state 3: the dynamical evolution carries 2 to 3. Let state 1 be a neighbor
of state 2 such that the dynamical evolution mixes 1 and 2. (I use here the
Schroedinger picture, for convenience.)
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The transition from 2 to 3 will tend to depopulate the coupled pair 1
and 2. This depopulation of the system 1 and 2 will occur naturally whether
or not any von Neumann collapse associated with P occurs. The question
is: Can a von Neumann collapse associated with P affect in a systematic
way the rate of depopulation from the coupled pair 1 and 2. The answer
is “Yes”: it can speed up the emptying of the amplitude in the system 1
and 2 into the system 3 that represents the motor action. This means that
the effect of repeatedly putting to nature the question associated with P can
have the effect of producing the motor action more quickly than what the
dynamics would do if no question was put: putting the question repeatedly
can effect the probabilities, compared Bohm’s model, in which there are no
collapses. The quantum rules regarding the probability of receiving a ‘Yes’,
or alternatively a ‘No’, are stricly observed.
To implement the dynamical conditions suppose the initial state is repre-
sented, in the basis consisting of our three states 1, 2, and 3, by the Hermitian
matrix S with S1,1 = x, S2,2 = y, S1,2 = z, S2,1 = z
∗, and all other elements
zero. Suppose the coupling between states 2 and 3 is represented by the
unitary matrix U with elements U1.1 = 1, and
U2,2 = U2,3 = U3,3 = −U3,2 = r = (2)
−1/2,
with all other elements zero.
The mixing between the states 1 and 2 is represented by the unitary
matrix M with
M1,1 = c,M1,2 = s,M2,1 = −s
∗,M2,2 = c
∗,M3,3 = 1,
with all other elements zero. Here c∗c+ s∗s = 1.
The initial probability to be in the state 2 is given Trace PS = y, where P
projects onto state 2. The action of U depopulates state 2: TracePUSU−1 =
y/2.
Then the action of the mixing of 1 and 2 generated by M brings the
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probability of state 2 to
TracePMUSU−1M−1 = (xs∗s) + (yc∗c/2)− zcs∗r − z∗c∗sr,
where r is one divided by the square root of 2
For the case c = s = r this gives for the probability of state 2:
(xs∗s) + (yc∗c/2)− zcs∗r − z∗c∗sr = x/2 + y/4− zr/2− z∗r/2
Since states 1 and 2 are supposed to be neighbors the most natural initial
condition would be that the feeding into these two states would be nearly the
same: the initial state would be a super position of the two states with almost
equal amplitudes. This would make x = y = z = z∗. Then the probability
of state 2 becomes
prob = y/2 + y/4− yr
Then the effect of the mixing M is to decrease from y/2 the probability in
the state 2 that feeds the motor action.
If the question E, with P(E)= P, is put to nature before U acts, then the
effect of the corresponding von Neumann reduction is to set z to zero. Hence
in this case
prob = y/2 + y/4,
and the probability is now increased from y/2.
Thus putting the question to Nature speeds up the motor response, on
the average, relative to what that speed would be if the question were not
asked.
The point of this calculation is to establish that this theory allows expe-
riences to exercise real control over brain activity, not only by making the
individual choices between possibilities whose probabilities are fixed by the
quantum rules, but also at a deeper level by shaping, through the choices of
which questions are put to nature, those statistical probabilities themselves.
This opens the door both to possible empirical tests of the presence of col-
lapses of the kind predicated in this theory, and to a natural-selection-driven
co-evolution of brains and their associated minds.
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14. Natural Selection and the Evolution of Consciousness.
In a naturalistic theory one would not expect consciousness to be present
in association with a biological system unless it had a function: nothing as
complex and refined as consciousness should be present unless it enhances
the survival prospects of the system in some way.
This requirement poses a problem for a classically described system be-
cause there consciousness is causally non-efficatious: it is epiphenomenal. Its
existence is not, under any boundary conditions, implied by the principles
of classical physics in the way that what we call “a tornado” is , under ap-
propriate boundary conditions, implied by the principles of classical physics.
Consciousness could therefore be stripped away without affecting the behav-
ior of the system in any way. Hence it could have no survival value.
Consider two species, generally on a par, but such that in the first the
survival-enhancing templates for action are linked to knowings, in the way
described above, but in the second there is no such linkage. Due to the en-
hancement effects described in the preceding section the members of the first
species will actualize their survival-enhancing templates for action faster and
more often than the members of the second species, and hence be more likely
to survive. And over the course of generations one would expect the organ-
ism to evolve in such a way that the possible experiences E associated with
it, and their consequences specified by the associated projection operators
P(E), will become ever better suited to the survival needs of the organism.
15. What is Consciousness?
When scientists who study consciousness are asked to define what it is
they study, they are reduced either to defining it in other words that mean the
same thing, or to defining it ostensively by directing the listener’s attention to
what the word stands for in his own life. In some sense that is all one can do
for any word: our language is a web of connections between our experiences
of various kinds, including sensations, ideas, thoughts, and theories.
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If we were to ask a physicist of the last century what an “electron” is,
he could tell us about its “charge”, and its “mass”, and maybe some things
about its “size”, and how it is related to “atoms”. But this could all be some
crazy abstract theoretical idea, unless a tie-in to experiences is made. How-
ever, he could give a lengthy description of this connection, as it was spelled
out by classical physical theory. Thus the reason that a rational physicist
or philosopher of the ninteenth century could believe that “electrons” were
real, and perhaps even “more real” than our thoughts about them, is that
they were understandable as parts of a well-defined mathematical framework
that accounted—perhaps not directly for our experiences themselves, but at
least—for how the contents of our experiences hang together in the way they
do.
Now, however, in the debate between materialists and idealists, the tables
are turned: the concepts of classical physics, including the classical concep-
tion of tiny electrons responding only to aspects of their local environment,
absolutely cannot account for the macroscopic phenomena that we see be-
fore our eyes. On the contrary: the only known theory that does account
for all the empirical phenomena, and that is not burdened with extravagent
needless ontological excesses, is a theory that is neatly formulated directly in
terms of our knowings. So the former reason for being satisfied with the idea
of an electron, namely that it is part of a parsimonious mathematical frame-
work that accounts quantitatively for the contents of our experiences, and
gives us a mathematical representation of what persists during the intervals
between our experiences, has dissolved insofar as it applies to the classical
idea of an electron: it applies now, instead, to our knowings, and the stored
compendium of all knowings, the Hilbert space state of the universe.
To elicit intuitions, the classical physicist might have resorted to a demon-
stration of tiny “pith balls” that attract or repel each other due to (unseen)
electric fields, and then asked the viewer to imagine much smaller versions
of what he sees before his eyes. This would give the viewer a direct intuitive
basis for thinking he understood what an electron is.
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This intuitive reason for the viewer’s being satisfied with the notion of an
electron as an element of reality is that it was a generalization of something
very familiar: a generalization of the tiny grains of sand that are so common
in our ordinary experience, or of the tiny pith balls.
No things are more familiar to us than our own experiences. Yet they
are elusive: each of them disappears almost as soon as it appears, and leaves
behind only a fading impression, and fallible memories.
However, I shall try in this section to nail down a more solid idea of what
a conscious experience is: it unifies the theoretical and intuitive aspects
described above.
The metaphor is the experienced sound of a musical chord.
We have all experienced how a periodic beat will, when the frequency is
increased, first be heard as a closely spaced sequence of individual pulses, then
as a buzz, then as a low tone, and then as tones of higher and higher pitch.
A tone of high pitch, say a high C, is not experienced by most listeners as a
sequence of finely spaced individual pulses, but as something experientially
unigue.
The same goes for major and minor chords: they are experienced differ-
ently, as a different gestalts. Each chord, as normally experienced, has its
own unique total quality, although an experienced listener can attend to it
in a way that may reveal the component elements.
One can generalize still further to the complex experience of a moment
of sound in a Beethoven symphony.
These examples show that a state that can be described physically as a
particular combination of vibratory motions is experienced as a particular
experiential quality: what we cannot follow in time, due to the rapidity of
the variations, is experienced as a gestalt-type impression that is a quality
of the entire distribution of energy among the sensed frequencies.
According to the theory purposed here, the aspect of brain dynamics that
corresponds to a conscious experience is a complex pattern of reverberating
patterns of EM excitations that has reached a stable steady state and become
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a template for immediate further brain action. Its actualization by a quan-
tum event initiates that action: it selects out of an infinite of alternative
competing and conflicting patterns of neural excitations a single coherent
energetic combination of reverberating patterns that initiates, quides, and
monitors, an ongoing coordinated evolution of neural activities. The experi-
ence that accompanies this suddenly-picked-out “chord” of reverberations is,
I suggest, the “quality” of this complex pattern of reverberations. Because
the sensed combinations of EM reverberations that constitute the template
for action is far more complex than those that represent auditory sounds,
the quality of the former chord must be far more complex than that of the
latter.
But the most important quality of our experiencess is that they have
meanings. These meanings arise from their intentionalities, which encompass
both intentions and attentions. The latter are intentions to attend to—and
thereby to update the brains representation of—what is attended to.
These aspects of the experience arise from their self-reproducing quality:
their quality of re-creating themselves. In the case of our human thoughts
this self-reproductive feature has evolved to the point such that the present
thought contains a representation of what will be part of a subsequent thought:
the present experience E contains an image of a certain prolongation (pro-
jection into the future) of the current Jamesian sequence of temporal compo-
nents that is likely, by virtue of the causal effect of E, namely S–> PSP, with
P = P(E), to be the current Jamesian sequence of a subsequent experience
E ′.
Thus the meaning of the experience, through physically imbedded in the
present state of the brain that it engenders, consists of the image of the future
that it is likely to generate, within the context of its fringe.
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Appendix A. Quantum Effect of Presynaptic Calcium Ion Diffu-
sion.
Let me assume here, in order to focus attention on a particular easily
analyzable source of an important quantum effect, that the propagation of
the action potential along nerve fibers is well represented by the classical
Hodgson-Huxley equation, and that indeed all of brain dynamics is well rep-
resented by the classical approximation apart from one aspect, namely the
motions of the pre-synaptic calcium ions from the exit of the micro-channels
(through which they have entered the nerve terminal) to their target sites.
The capture of the ion at the target site releases a vesicle of neurotransmitter
into the synaptic cleft.
The purpose of the brain activity is to process clues about the outside
world coming from the sensors, within the context of a current internal state
representing the individual’s state of readiness, in order to produce an ap-
propriate “template for action”, which can then direct the ensuing action
(Stapp, 1993). Let it be supposed that the classically described evolution of
the brain, governed by the complex nonlinear equations of neurodynamics,
will cause the brain state move into the vicinity of one member of a set of
attractors. The various attractors represent the various possible templates
for action: starting from this vicinity, the state of the classically described
body/brain will evolve through a sequence of states that represent the macro-
scopic course of action specified by that template for action.
Within this classically described setting there are nerve terminals con-
taining the presynaptic calcium ions. The centers of mass of these ions must
be treated as quantum mechanical variables. To first approximation this
means that each of these individual calcium ions is represented as if it were
a statistical ensemble of classically conceived calcium ions: each individual
(quantum) calcium ion is represented as a cloud or swarm of virtual classi-
cal calcium ions all existing together, superposed. This cloud of superposed
virtual copies is called the wave packet. Our immediate interest is in the
motion of this wave packet as it moves from the exit of a microchannel of
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diameter 1 nanometer to a target trigger site for the release of a vesicle of
neurotransmitter into the synaptic cleft.
The irreducible Heisenberg uncertainty in the velocity of the ion as it
exits the microchannel is about 1.5 m/sec, which is smaller than its thermal
velocity by a factor of about 4×10−3. The distance to the target trigger site
is about 50 nanometers. (Fogelson,1985;Zucker,1986) Hence the spreading of
the wave packet is of the order of 0.2 nanometers, which is of the order of
the size of the ion itself, and of the target trigger site. Thus the decision as
to whether the vesicle is released or not, in an individual instance, will have
a large uncertainty due to the large Heisenberg quantum uncertainty in the
position of the calcium ion relative to the trigger site: the ion may hit the
trigger site and release the vesicle, or it may miss it the trigger site and fail
to release the vesicle. These two possibilities, yes or no, for the release of this
vesicle by this ion continue to exist, in a superposed state, until a “reduction
of the wave packet” occurs.
If there is a situation in which a certain particular set of vesicles is re-
leased, due to the relevant calcium ions having been captured at the ap-
propriate sites, then there will be other nearby parts of the (multi-particle)
wave function of the brain in which some or all of the relevant captures do
not take place—simply because, for those nearby parts of the wave function,
the pertinent calcium ions miss their targets—and hence the corresponding
vesicles are not released.
More generally, this means, in a situation that corresponds to a very
large number N of synaptic firings, that, until a reduction occurs, all of the
2N possible combinations of firings and no firings will be represented with
comparable statistical weight in the wave function of the brain/body and its
environment. Different combinations of these firings and no firings can lead
to different attractors, and thence to very different macroscopic behaviours
of the body that is being controlled by this brain.
The important thing, here, is that there is, on top of the nonlinear classi-
cally described neurodynamics, a quantum mechanical statistical effect arising
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from the spreading out of the wave functions of the centers of mass of the
various presynaptic calcium ions relative to their target trigger sites.The
spreading out of the wave packet is unavoidable, because it is a consequence
of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle. This spreading is extremely impor-
tant, because it entails that every vesicle release will be accompanied by a
superposed alternative situation of comparable statistical weight in which
that vesicle is not released. This means that wave function of the entire
brain must, as a direct consequence of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle,
disperse into a shower of superposed possibilities arising from all the differ-
ent possible combinations of vesicle releases or non-releases. Each possibility
can be expected to evolve into the neighborhood of some one of the many
different attractors. These different attactors will be brain states that will
evolve, in turn, if no reduction occurs, into different possible macroscopic
behaviors of the brain and body.
Thus the effect of the spreadings of the wave functions of the centers of
the presynaptic calcium ions is enormous: it will cause the wave function
of the person’s body in its environment to disperse, if no reduction occurs,
into a profusion of branches that represent all of the possible actions that
the person is at all likely to take in the circumstance at hand. The eventual
reduction of the wave packet becomes, then, the decisive controlling factor:
in any given individual situation the reduction selects—from among all of the
possible macroscopically different large-scale bodily actions generated by the
nonlinear (and, we have supposed, classically describable) neurodynamics—
the single action that actually occurs.
In this discussion I have generated the superposed macroscopically dif-
ferent possibilities by considering only the spreading out of the wave packets
of the centers-of-mass of the pertinent presynaptic calcium ions relative to
the target trigger sites, imagining the rest of the brain neurodynamics to be
adequately approximated by the nonlinear classically describable neurody-
namics of the brain. Improving upon this approximation would tend only to
increase the quantum effect I have described.
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It should be emphasized that this effect is generated simply by the Heisen-
berg uncertainty principle, and hence cannot be simply dismissed or ignored
within a rational scientific approach. The effect is in no way dependent upon
macroscopic quantum coherence, and is neither wiped out nor diminished by
thermal noise. The shower of different macroscopic possibilities created by
this effect can be reduced to the single actual macroscopic reality that we
observe only by a reduction of the wave packet.
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Appendix B. Knowings, Knowledge, and Causality.
I shall flesh out here the idea that Nature is built out of knowings, not
matter.
A typical knowing of the kind that quantum theory is built upon is a
knowing that the pointer on the measuring device appears to lie between
the numbers 6 and 7 on the dial. This is the sort of fact that all (or at
least most) of science is built upon. It is quite complex. The idea that
the appearance pertains to a dial on something that acts as a measuring
device has a tremendous amount of education and training built into it. Yet
somehow this knowing has this background idea built into it: that idea is a
part of the experience.
William James says about perceptions:
“Your acquaintance with reality grows literally by buds or drops of percep-
tion. Intellectually and upon reflection you can divide these into components,
but as immediately given they come totally or not at all.”
This fits perfectly with Copenhagen quantum theory, which takes these
gestalts as the basic elements of the theory. In the von Neumann/ Wigner
type ontology adopted here there is, in association with this knowing, a
collapse of the state vector of the universe. It is specified by acting on
this state with a projection operator that acts on the degrees of freedom
associated with the brain of the perceiver, and that reduces the state of the
body/brain of the observer, and consequently also the state of the whole
universe, to the part of that state that is compatible with this knowing.
So a knowing is a complex experiential type of event that, however, ac-
cording to the theory, occurs in conjunction with a correspondingly complex
“physical” event that reduces the state of the the brain/body of the person
to whom the experience belongs to the part of that state that is compati-
ble with the knowing. [I shall use the word “physical” to denote the aspect
of nature that is represented in the Hilbert-space description used in quan-
tum theory: this aspect is the quantum analog of the physical description of
classical physics.]
59
That “person” is a system consisting of a sequence of knowings bound
together by a set of tendencies that are specified by the state of the universe.
This state is essentially a compendium of prior knowings. However, these
knowings are not merely human knowings, but more general events of which
human knowings are a special case.
In strict Copenhagen interpretation quantum theory is regarded as merely
a set of rules for making predictions about human knowledge on the basis
of human knowledge: horses and pigs do not make theoretical calculations
using these ideas about operators in Hilbert space, and their “knowings” are
not included in “our knowldge.
But in a science-based ontology it would be unreasonable to posit that
human knowledge plays a singular role: human knowings must be assumed
to be particular examples of a general kind of “knowings” that would include
“horse knowings” and “pig knowings”. These could be degraded in many
ways compared to human knowings, and perhaps richer in some other di-
mensions, but they should still be of the same general ontological type. And
there should have been some sort of things of this general ontological kind
even before the emergence of life. [In the section, “What is Consciousness”,
I have tried to provide an intuition about what a knowing associated with a
nonbiological system might be like.]
Science is an ongoing endeavor that is expected to develop ever more
adequate (for human needs) ideas about the nature of ourselves and of the
world in which we find ourselves. Newton himself seemed to understand this,
although some of his successors did not. But the present stage of theoretical
physics makes it clear that we certainly do not now know all the answers to
even the most basic questions: physics is still very much in a groping stage
when it comes to the details of the basic underlying structure. So it would be
folly, from a scientific perspective, to say that we must give specific answers
now to all questions, in the way that classical physics once presumed to do.
This lack of certainty is highlighted by the fact that the Copenhagen
school could claim to give practical rules that worked in the realm of human
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knowledge without paying any attention to the question of how nonhuman
knowings entered into nature. And no evidence contrary to Copenhagen
quantum theory has been established. This lack of data about nonhuman
knowledge would make it presumptuous, in a science-based approach, to try
to spell out at this time details of the nature of nonhuman knowings, beyond
the reasonable presumption that animals with bodies structurally similar to
the bodies of human beings ought, to the extent they also behave like human
beings, to have similar experiences. But knowings cannot be assumed to be
always exactly the kinds of experiences that we human beings have, and they
could be quite different.
The knowings that I mentioned at the outset were percepts: knowings
that appear to be knowings about things lying outside the person’s body.
But, according to the von Neummann/ Wigner interpretation, each such
knowing is actually connected directly to the state of the person’s body/brain,
after that event has occurred. This state of the body/brain will, in the case
of percepts of the external world, normally be correlated to aspects of the
state of the universe that are not part of the body/brain. But experienced
feelings, such as the feelings of warmth, joy, depression, devotion, patrio-
tism, mathematical understandings, etc. are not essentially different from
percepts: all are experiences that are associated with collapse events that
reduce the state of the body/brain to the part of it that is compatible with
the experience..
I have spoken here of a body/brain, and its connection to an experience.
But what is this body/brain? It seems to be something different from the
knowing that it is connected to. And what is the nature of this connection?
The body/brain is an aspect of the quantum mechanically described state
of the universe. This Hilbert-space state (sometimes called density matrix)
is expressed as a complex-valued function of two vectors, each of which is
defined over a product of spaces, each of which corresponds to a degree of
freedom of the universe. Any system is characterized by a certain set of
degrees of freedom, and the state of that system is defined by taking the
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trace of the state of the universe over all other degrees of freedom, thereby
eliminating from this state any explicit reference to those other degrees of
freedom.
In this way the state of each system is separately definable, and depen-
dent only on its own degrees of freedom, even though the system itself is
basically only an aspect of the whole universe. Each part (i.e., system) is
separately definable, yet basically ontologically inseparable from the whole:
that is the inescapable basic message of quantum theory. Each system has
a state that depends only on its own degrees of freedom, and this system,
as specified by its state, is causally pertinent, because each knowing is as-
sociated with some system, and the probabilities for its alternative possible
knowings are specified by its own state, in spite of the fact that the system
itself is fundamentally an inseparable part of the entire universe. It is the
properties of the trace operation that reconciles these disparate requirements
The state of the universe specifies only the probabilities for knowings to
occur, and it generally undergoes an instantaneous global instantaneous jump
when a new knowing occurs. But this probability, by virtue of the way it
jumps when a new knowing occurs, and suddenly changes in regions far away
from the system associated with the new knowing, and that it is formulated
in terms of infinite sets of pssibilities that may never occur, is more like an
idea or a thought than a material reality. Indeed, these properties of the state
are exactly why the founders of quantum theory were led to the conclusion
that the mathematical formalism that they created was about knowledge.
The state of the universe is the preserved compendium of all knowings.
More precisely, it is an aspect of that compendium that expresses certain
statistical properties pertaining to the next knowing. There is presume-
ably some deeper structure, not captured by the properties expressed in the
Hilbert-space mathematical structure, that fixes what actually happens.
The knowings that constitute our experiences are the comings into being
of bits of knowledge, which join to form the knowledge that is represented
by the state of the universe. This gives an ontology based on knowings, with
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nothing resembling matter present. But the statistical causal structure of
the sequence knowings is expressed in terms of equations that are analogs
of the mathematical laws that governed the matter postulated to exist by
the principles of classical mechanics. This connection to classical mechanics
is enough to ensure a close similarity between the predictions of classical
mechanics and those of quantum mechanics in many cases of interest, even
though the two theories are based on very different mathematical structures.
If one starts from the ontological framework suggested by classical me-
chanics the questions naturally arise: Why should experiences exist at all?
And given that they do exist, Why should they be composed of such qualities
as sensations of (experiential) colors and (experiential) sounds, and feelings
of warmth and coldness, and perceptions of simple geometric forms that cor-
respond more directly to the shapes of structures outside the body/brain
than to structures (such as patterns of neural excitations that are presum-
ably representing these various features) inside the body/brain. How do these
experiential types of qualities arise in a world that is composed exclusively
of tiny material particle and waves? The experiential qualities are not con-
structible from their physical underpinnings in the way that all the physical
properties of a tornado are, according to classical mechanics, constructible
from its physical constituents.
Quantum theory allows one to get around these questions by eliminating
that entire classical ontology that did not seem to mesh naturally with expe-
riential realities, and replacing that classical ontology with one built around
experiential realities. These latter realities are embedded in a specified way,
which is fixed by the pragmatic rules, into a mathematical structure that al-
lows the theory to account for all the successes of classical mechanics without
being burdened with its awkward ontological baggage.
A discussion of this appendix with cognitive scientist Pat Hayes can be
found on my website:
(http://www-physics.lbl.gov/‘tilde’stapp/stappfiles.html),
where ‘tilde’ stands for the tilde symbol.
63
Appendix C. Quantum Wholism and Consciousness.
One reason touted for the need to use quantum theory in order to acco-
modate consciousness in our scientific understanding of brain dynamics is the
seeming pertinence of quantum wholism to the unitary or wholistic character
of the conscious experience.
I shall here spell out that reason within the framework of a computer
simulation of brain dynamics.
Suppose we consider a field theory of the brain, with several kinds of
interacting fields, say, for example, the electric and magnetic fields, and a field
representing some mass- and charge-carrying field. Suppose the equations of
motion are local and deterministic. This means that the evolution in time
of each field value at each spacetime point is completely determined by the
values of the various fields in the immediate neighborhood of that spacetime
point. Suppose we can, with good accuracy, simulate this evolution with a
huge collection of computers, one for each point of a cubic lattice of finely
spaced spatial points, where each computer puts out a new set of values for
each the fields, evaluated at that its own spatial point, at each of a sequence
of finely spaced times. Each computer has inputs only from the outputs of
its nearest few neighbors, over a few earlier times in the sequence of times.
The outputs are digital, and the equations of motion are presumed to reduce
to finite-difference equations that can be readily solved by the stripped-down
computers, which can do only that. Thus, given some appropriate initial
conditions at some early times, this battery of simple digital computers will
grind out the evolution of the simulated brain.
Merely for definiteness I assume that the spatial lattice has a thousand
points along each edge, so the entire lattice has a billion points. Thus our
simulator has a billion simple computers.
Now suppose after some long time the field values should come to spell
out a gigantic letter “M”: i.e., the fields all vanish except on a set of lattice
points that have the shape of a letter “M” on one of the faces of the lattice.
If the outputs are printed out at the location of the corresponding grid point
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then you or I, observing the lattice, would know that the letter “M” had
been formed.
But would the battery of dynamically linked but ontologically distinct
computers itself contain that information explicitly? None of the comput-
ers has any information in its memory except information about numbers
pertaining to its immediate neighborhood: each computer “knows” nothing
except what its immediate environment is. So nowhere in the battery of
computers, B, has the higher-level information about the global structure
been assessed and recorded: the fact that an “M” has been formed is not
“known” to the battery of computers. Some other computer C, appropriately
constructed, could examine the outputs of the various elements of B, and is-
sue a correct statement about this global properties of B, but that global
information is not explicity expressed in the numbers that are recorded in B
itself: some extra processing would be needed for that.
Of course, brains examine themselves. So B itself might be able to do
the job that C did above, and issue the statement about its own global
property, and also record that information in some way in the configuration
of values in the various simple computers: the existence of this configuration
can be supposed to have been caused by the presence of the “M”, and can be
supposed to cause, under appropriate conditions, the battery of computers
B to display on some lattice face the message: “I did contain an ‘M’ ”.
So the information about the global structure is now properly contained
in the structure of B, as far as causal functioning is concerned. But even
though the configuration of values that carries the information about the
“M” is correctly linked causally to past and future, this configuration itself
is no more than any such configurations was before, namely a collection of
tiny bits of information about tiny regions in space. There is nothing in this
classical conception that corresponds ontologically to the entire gestalt, “M”,
as a whole. The structure of classical physics is such that the present reality
is specified by values located within in an infinitesimal interval centered on
the present instant, without any need to refer to any more distant times. To
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bring relationships to the past and future events into the present evolving
ontological reality would be alien to the ideas of classical physics. There
is simply no need to expand the idea of reality in this way: it adds only
superfluities to the ontologically and dynamically closed structure of classical
physics.
The situation changes completely when one quantizes the system. To
make a computer simulation of the quantum dynamics one generalizes the
spatial points of the classical theory to super-points. Each possible entire
classical state is a super-point. In our case, each super-point is defined by
specifying at each of the points in the lattice a possible value of each of the
several (in our case three) fields. To each super-point we assign a super-
computer. If the number of discrete allowed values for our original simple
computers was, say, one thousand possible values for each of the three fields,
and hence 109 possible output values in all for each simple computer, then the
number of allowed classical states would be 109 raised to the power 109: each
of the 109 simple computers can have 109 possible values. Thus the number
of needed super-computers would be 109 raised to the power 109. In the
dynamical evolution each of these super-computers generates, in succession,
one complex number (two real numbers) at each of the times in the finely
spaced sequence of times.
One can imagine that a collapse event at some time might make all of
these complex numbers, except one, equal to zero, and make the remaining
one equal to 1. Then the state would be precisely one of the 109 to the power
109 classical states. It would then evolve into a superposition of possible
classical states until the next collapse occurs. But the collapse takes the state
to a “whole” classical world. That is, each super-computer is associated not
just with some tiny region, but with the whole system, and the collapses can
be to states in which some whole region of spacetime has a fixed configuration
of values. Thus, for example, there would be a super-computer such that its
output’s being unity would mean that “M” appeared on one face. And the
collapse to that single state would actualize that gestalt “M”. The sudden
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selective creation of this gestalt is more similar to someone’s experiencing this
gestalt than any occurrence or happening in the classical dynamics, because
in both the experience and the quantum event the whole body of information
(the whole “M”) suddenly appears.
This intuitive similarity of collapse events to conscious events is a reason
why many quantum theorists are attracted to the idea that conscious events
are quantum events. Orthodox quantum theory rests on that idea.
There is in the quantum ontology a tie-in to past and future, because if
one asks what the present reality is, the answer can be either knowledge of the
past, or potentialities for the future: the present is an abrupt transition from
fixed past to open future, not a slice of a self-sufficient continuous reality.
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Appendix D. The Dilemma of Free Will.
The two horns of this dilemma are ‘determinism’ and ‘chance’. If deter-
minism holds then a person seems reduced to a mechanical device, no more
responsible for his acts than a clock is responsible for telling the wrong time.
But if determinism fails then his actions are controlled in part by “chance”,
rendering him even less responsible for his acts.
This argument can powerfully affect on our lives: it allows us to rationalize
our own moral failings, and it influences the way we, and our institutions,
deal with the failings of others.
It might appear that there is no way out: either the world is deterministic
or it’s not, and the second possibility involves chance. So we get hung on
one horn or the other.
Quantum ontology evades both horns.
The point is that determinism does not imply mechanism. The reason we
say we are not responsible if determinism holds is that “determinism” evokes
the idea of “mechanism”; it evokes the idea of a clock. And, indeed, that’s
exactly what is entailed by the determinism of classical mechanics. According
to the principles of classical mechanics everything you will do in your life was
fixed and settled before you were born by local ‘myopic’ mechanical laws:
i.e., by essentially the same sort of local mechanical linkages that control
the workings of a clock. If your thoughts and ideas enter causally into the
physical proceedings at all, it is only to the extent that they are themselves
completely controlled by these local mechanical processes. Hence the causes
of your actions can be reduced to a huge assembly of thoughtless microscopic
processes.
But in quantum dynamics our knowings enter as the central dynamical
units. What we have is a dynamics of knowings that evolve according to
the rules of quantum dynamics. To be sure these dynamical rules do involve
elements of chance, but these are no more problematic than the thermal
and environmental noise that occurred in the classical case: our high-level
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structures cannot maintain total fine control over every detail. But there is,
in spite of that important similarity, a huge difference because in the classical
case everything was determined from the bottom up, by thoughtless micro
processes, whereas in the quantum case everything is determined from the
top down, by a dynamics that connects earlier knowings to later knowings.
And these knowings are doing what we feel they are doing: initiating
complex actions, both physical and mental, that pave the way to future
knowings.
No reduction to knowingless process is possible because each step in the
dynamical processes is the actualization of a knowing that is represented
mathematically as the grasping, as a whole, of a structural complex that is
equivalent to the structure of the knowing.
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